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This study proposes the use of the Bayesian network relative risk model (BN-RRM) to estimate 
the risk associated with the release of gene drives as vectors to control disease, using Ponce, 
Puerto Rico as a case study. Bayesian networks are an appropriate risk assessment tool for 
quantitatively and probabilistically examining complex systems involving multiple stressors 
acting on multiple endpoints in a wide variety of situations. The emerging field of synthetic 
biology has the capacity to drastically alter ecological systems with the use of gene drive 
engineered organisms as a method to alter population dynamics. The purpose of the release of 
a gene drive organism is for the introduced genetic material to propagate within the wild type 
population and persist within the environment. There are many proposed gene drive designs 
and no regulatory framework that quantitatively assess the risk associated with the use of gene 
drive engineered organisms released to the environment. The risk assessment describes how 
the gene drive may spread through the populations of wild type mosquitoes and decrease rates 
of disease. The Bayesian network relative risk model can perform the risk assessment of gene 
drive engineered Ae. aegypti for vector control and as part of an adaptive management strategy 
to reduce dengue and Zika transmission. This study illustrates how the BN-RRM can integrate 
gene drive related information within a risk assessment framework suitable for adaptive 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to risk assessment for synthetic biology 
Given the current state of gene drive technology and the lack of regulatory oversight, it is clear 
that risk assessment is necessary in order to understand any adverse effects that the release of 
gene drive organisms may pose (NASEM 2016). Therefore, the goal of my study is to use 
Bayesian network tools to model the risk associated with the applications of synthetic biology 
products and how human health endpoints are impacted as a result. Specifically, I will apply the 
Bayesian network relative risk model (BN-RRM) to examine the risk of releasing gene drive 
engineered Aedes aegypti mosquitoes as vectors to control both the dengue and Zika virus 
using Ponce, Puerto Rico as a case study. 
1.2 Gene drives 
The use of gene drives to control pest species has been speculated since the late sixties (Curtis 
1968; Foster et al. 1972). Gene drives are genetic constructs that represent themselves at rates 
greater than that of the Mendelian 50/50 ratio. Using a gene drive a trait deemed beneficial for 
some purpose could be introduced into a target population and driven to fixation in a relatively 
quick timeframe (Webber et al. 2015). Developments in biotechnology and synthetic biology 
engineering have made gene drives no longer speculation but a reality. The discovery and use 
of clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR associated 
protein 9 (Cas9) as a genetic engineering tool has led to the ability to precisely edit the genetic 
code of almost any living organism (Webber et al. 2015; Knott & Doudna 2018). 
1.3 CRISPR/Cas9 
Discovered in bacteria, CRISPR/Cas9 acts as an immune response to foreign viral DNA within 
bacterial cells (Knott & Doudna 2018). The CRISPR/Cas9 complex re-writes segments of 
genetic code by cutting a strand of DNA at a specific site and either replacing or removing a 
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genetic sequence. Using a complementary guide-RNA, the CRISPR/Cas9 complex homes to a 
specific sequence of genetic code. Once this site is located on the genome, a double strand 
break is made and the new sequence of base pairs is inserted into the target site. The 
CRISPR/Cas9 complex then disassociates and the cells own DNA repair mechanisms complete 
the process. By attaching a cargo sequence to the CRISPR/Cas9 complex, new traits can be 
written into the genetic code of nearly any organism (Webber et al. 2015; Knott & Doudna 
2018).  
1.4 Inheritance 
Gene drives can and do occur naturally as selfish genetic elements (Burt and Trivers 2006). 
These naturally occurring drive systems achieve superseded Mendelian inheritance rates 
without any positive implications to individual fitness (Burt and Trivers 2006). These naturally 
occurring drive systems include: transposable elements (McClintock 1951; McClintock 1956; 
and Wicker et al. 2007), meiotic drives (McDermott and Noor 2010; Hickey and Craig 1966; 
Sweeny and Barr 1978; Hiraizumi and Crow 1960; Silver 1993; Ardlie 1998; Rhoades and 
Dempsey 1985), underdominance (Altrock et al. 2011; Curtis 1968), maternal-effect dominant 
embryonic arrest (Beeman et al. 1992), and homing endonuclease genes (Fraser 2012; Jasin 
1996) 
The transposable elements are short sequences of DNA that can change location within the 
genome by randomly removing and reinserting themselves at another location. Transposable 
elements were discovered in 1952 in maize (McClintock 1951; McClintock 1956) and have since 
been described in other eukaryotes (Wicker et al. 2007). 
Meiotic drive systems are interference drive mechanisms that lead to disproportional allele 
frequencies relative to Mendelian rates (McDermott and Noor 2010). These types of gene drives 
interfere with some aspect of the phenotypic expression as a result of reducing functionality at 
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certain loci. For example, in mosquitoes a meiotic drive has been observed that interferes with 
sex-linked chromosomes, resulting in a disproportionate male-to-female sex ratio, favoring 
males (Hickey and Craig 1966; Sweeny and Barr 1978). In addition to mosquitoes (Hickey and 
Craig 1966; Sweeny and Barr 1978), meiotic drive systems have been observed in Drosophila 
melanogaster (Hiraizumi and Crow 1960), Mus musculus (Silver 1993; Ardlie 1998), and maize 
(Rhoades and Dempsey 1985). 
Other forms of naturally occurring gene drive systems include underdominance. 
Underdominance occurs when the heterozygous offspring of two homozygous individuals incurs 
a fitness reduction relative to the parent organisms (Altrock et al. 2011). Curtis (1968) described 
underdominance systems that could be used to reduce pest species by causing sterility through 
introduced genes. 
Another gene drive system, maternal-effect dominant embryonic arrest, has been described in 
the flour beetle (Tribolium castaneum) where offspring that lack the associated chromosome are 
nonviable (Beeman et al. 1992). Only offspring that are homozygous for the maternal-effect 
dominant embryonic arrest chromosome develop properly, thereby superseding Mendelian 
inheritance rates (Beeman et al. 2012).  
Although gene drives occur naturally, they can now be created in the lab using techniques 
available through CRISPR/Cas9 (Gantz et al. 2015; Hammond et al. 2016; Champer et al. 2017; 
Buchman et al. 2018; Buchman et al. 2019). When CRISPR/Cas9 inputs a genetic sequence 
into the germline of an organism, the associated trait is inheritable (Webber et al. 2015). 
Regular Mendelian inheritance rates can then be superseded by incorporating the sequence 
calling for the entire CRISPR/Cas9 and guide-RNA complex and any attached cargo sequence 
into each chromosome during cellular development (Leftwich et al. 2018). In a rapidly 
reproducing target population with short generational times it may be possible that an 
introduced trait can be driven to fixation over a relatively short temporal scale, despite any 
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potential fitness implication due to the presence of the gene drive (Webber et al. 2015; Leftwich 
et al. 2018). 
1.5 Proposed applications for environmental management 
The broad applicability of genetic manipulation using CRISPR/Cas9 has led to numerous 
speculative proposals for the use of gene drives as ecosystem engineering catalysts (Webber et 
al. 2015; Gantz et al. 2015; Hammond et al. 2016; Champer et al. 2017; Buchman et al. 2018; 
Buchman et al. 2019). The majority of these potential uses fall under two main categories: 
population replacement or population suppression (Leftwich et al. 2018). Population 
replacement gene drives introduce a desired trait into a target population and over time replace 
the existing wild-type population with the new population that carries the introduced trait. 
Population suppression gene drives introduce a deleterious trait into a target population that 
spreads regardless of the magnitude of fitness costs at super Mendelian rates, potentially 
crashing populations within several generations (Windbichler et al. 2011; Adelman & Tu 2016; 
Hammond et al. 2016; Champer et al. 2017; Marcias et al. 2017; Buchman et al. 2018; Kyrou et 
al. 2018). 
1.6 Pest management 
Population suppression gene drives have been described for use as pest management tools in 
the context of invasive species (Prowse et al. 2017), agricultural pest species (Scott et al. 2018), 
and as methods of reducing mosquito borne illness (Windbichler et al. 2011; Hammond et al. 
2016; Champer et al. 2017; Buchman et al. 2018; Kyrou et al. 2018). Suppression drives have 
been modeled for use in invasive mouse populations by introducing sex specific traits that lead 
to populations becoming infertile (Prowse et al. 2017).  Synthetic CRISPR/Cas9 based gene 
drives that target agricultural pest species that are normally controlled through the use of 
pesticides have been described (Scott et al. 2018). Perhaps the most commonly proposed 
application of population suppression drives is the control of species that vector disease, 
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especially in mosquitoes (Windbichler et al. 2011; Hammond et al. 2016; Champer et al. 2017; 
Buchman et al. 2018; Kyrou et al. 2018).  
1.7 Mosquito borne disease 
Worldwide the burden of mosquito borne disease is staggering. Even with the best attempts at 
management, malaria alone kills on average over 400,000 people each year (WHO 2019). 
Many of these deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In the Americas, dengue is more 
prevalent, with 10,160,612 reported cases and 5,163 deaths over the last 7 years (PAHO 2020). 
Newly introduced diseases, like Zika virus, when introduced into an immunologically naïve 
population, have the capability to spread at epidemic proportions (Barrera et al. 2017). Current 
management strategies center on breeding habitat reduction and the use of pesticides when 
removal of breeding habitat is not feasible. Other management strategies include aerial spraying 
of insecticides indoors and outdoors, and the use of structural barriers, like mosquito nets and 
window screens (EPA 2016a, b, c). There are no current vaccinations for either dengue or Zika, 
though their development is being studied (Noyd and Sharp 2015; Barrett 2018; CDC 2018). 
1.8 Current synthetic biology regulations 
The risks posed by the use of synthetic biology products are not adequately covered by the 
current regulatory framework in the U.S. (NASEM 2016). The current regulatory laws are not 
specific to synthetic biology and therefore do not cover the unique risks that synthetic biology 
poses (NASEM 2016). Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) there are no 
requirements for quantitative assessment of risk nor the probability of effects. Current NEPA 
regulations do not require uncertainty to be reported. The lack of testable hypotheses of the 
environmental impact statement, that NEPA does require, makes the process less geared 
toward developing future research. Ecological risk assessment gives the probability of the 
desired outcomes as well as the indirect effects. Though NEPA does not require an ecological 
risk assessment to be conducted, other various regulations do (e.g. Federal Insecticide, 
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Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act). The general guidelines that the U.S.  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires for ecological risk assessment are: problem 
formulation, analysis, and risk characterization. These EPA guidelines do not require 
quantitative, probabilistic outcomes (NASEM 2016). 
Many questions about the use of gene drive organisms are related to probabilities of the 
outcomes both desired and undesired (NASEM 2016). The desired outcome of the release of a 
gene drive is to introduce a genetic element that persists in the environment through preferential 
inheritance and has an effect on population dynamics. The current field is lacking in studies that 
describe the risk associated with the introduction of a gene drive engineered species. As 
currently framed by the EPA, ecological risk assessments are not well suited to mathematically 
describe the multiplicity of interactions between stressors and endpoints over broad spatial 
scales. The BN-RRM is designed for such complex interactions and are able to quantitatively 
represent the interactions among multiple stressors and multiple endpoints across large spatial 
and temporal scales (NASEM 2016). 
1.9 The relative risk model for ecological risk assessment 
Landis and Wiegers (1997) developed an ecological risk assessment design that considered the 
interactions between the stressors and endpoints, the variation of the different stressors, and 
the spatial interests of stakeholders. This ecological risk assessment approach was applied to a 
real-world scenario by Wiegers et al. (1998), where risks and associated impacts of 
anthropogenic stressors were compared and evaluated for the marine environment of Port 
Valdez, Alaska. The model aided managers in developing testable hypotheses to further reduce 
impacts (Wiegers et al. 1998). Further iterations led to the development of the relative risk 
model that has been successfully applied to many very different risk assessment scenarios 
7 
 
(Hayes and Landis 2004; Landis and Wiegers 2005; Colnar and Landis 2007; Anderson and 
Landis 2012). 
Hayes and Landis (2004) used the relative risk model to assess the regional coastal marine 
area near Cherry Point, WA. The goal was to develop a model that estimated the risk 
associated with anthropogenic sources to biological endpoints in order to aid the decision-
making process of the Washington Department of Natural Resources. The results of the model 
depicted the risk of habitats to stressors, which stressors were likely to result in stronger 
impacts, and the endpoints most at risk (Hayes and Landis 2004). 
In Landis and Wiegers (2005), the outline of a regional ecological risk assessment was 
presented. In the assessment, habitats and sources of stressors within the study area are 
classified. Ranks were given weighting the relative importance of each per location within the 
study area to give levels of possible risk. If a succinct pathway between components of the 
RRM was found, then there was a risk to the associated endpoint.  
In Colnar and Landis (2007), the previously developed Relative Risk Model was applied to 
determining the risk associated with an invasive species (C. maenas) to the Cherry Point, WA, 
region. The authors investigated the probability of introduction of green crabs to the study area, 
as well as the effects of the introduction green crabs to the overall region. The risk to the region 
was determined using two scenarios: 1) established conditions, and 2) conditions associated 
with El Niño events which may influence dispersal patterns. The objective for the authors was to 
develop a system which incorporated conditions and management goals to develop testable 
hypotheses which could lead to better allocation of resources by management to attain their 
goals (Colnar and Landis 2007).  
In Anderson and Landis (2012), the relative risk model was applied to an entire watershed 
which consists of the Upper Grande Ronde area of eastern Oregon. The area of study was an 
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area of concern as outlined by the U.S. Forest Service. The goals brought forward by the U.S. 
Forest Service included management strategies aimed at predicting the outcomes of 
disturbance regimes and other processes (Anderson and Landis 2012).  
1.10 The Bayesian network relative risk model 
Cain et al. (1999) described the application of Bayesian networks to natural resource 
management. Cain et al. (1999) found that Bayesian networks provide quantitative methods for 
analyzing ecological systems and highlight uncertainties in a way that managers and the public 
can easily understand. In a key publication, Marcot et al. (2006) developed a set of guidelines 
for constructing Bayesian networks specifically to be used in ecological scenarios. Marcot et al. 
(2006) argued that although Bayesian networks had been used in the past to model complex 
ecosystem interactions, the models themselves had not been developed using a standard 
process, nor had they been consistently evaluated after more data became available. 
Using the guidelines constructed by Cain et al. (1999) and Marcot et al. (2006), various BN-
RRMs were developed that showed their effectiveness in modeling risk over large spatial scales 
(Ayre and Landis 2012), climate change (Landis et al. 2013), contaminants and urbanization 
(Hines and Landis 2013), the spread of a novel disease in trout species (Ayre et al. 2014), and 
risk to benthic estuarine populations (Graham et al. 2019). Ayre and Landis (2012) first applied 
the Bayesian network approach to ecological risk assessment while studying a large-scale 
terrestrial ecosystem. In Landis et al. (2013), the BN-RRM was used as an approach to 
assessing risk to systems from global climate change. Hines and Landis (2013) assessed risk of 
prespawn mortality in Coho salmon as a result of contaminants associated with urbanization 
and land-use. Ayre et al. (2014) applied the BN-RRM to the spread of whirling disease in native 
populations of cutthroat trout in the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers. Graham et al. (2019) 
showed another case where the BN-RRM is an appropriate risk assessment tool by modeling 
benthic population risk in estuary systems in Australia. 
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The use of gene drives creates a potential for long term effects and impacts in a variety of 
different ways and ecosystems (NASEM 2016). Any design of a gene drive will impact not just 
the target species, but potentially all other species within an ecosystem to more or less of a 
degree. Gene drives have been proposed for use in terrestrial as well as aquatic systems, 
leaving the potential for interactions almost endless. The use of BN-RRMs  can provide the 
foundation for evaluating the risk associated with gene drives because information regarding the 
genetics and ecological interactions can included in the BN-RRM ecological risk assessment 
approach. There are components of BN-RRMs that make them well suited to assessing risk 
related to the deployment of gene drives.  
The BN-RRM requires clear dialog between stakeholders, the public, managers, and 
researchers to define goals and endpoints. For gene drive use, there will be stakeholders 
represented from every socio-economic background with differing values that need to be 
addressed. When a mechanistic understanding of interactions is known, causal pathways are 
clearly represented within the BN-RRM and the outcomes are given as probabilities of relative 
risk. This poses a potential source of uncertainty for gene drives because there are lots of areas 
of uncertainty. For example, greater understanding of how the gene drive spreads in lab trials 
does not necessarily translate into field trials.  
As gene drive research progresses, more information gained at the cellular level may produce 
more questions at the organismal level. The world that gene drives will ultimately be introduced 
is inherently an open system, meaning that the interactions taking place as a result of the drive 
will change within a project as the timescale changes, as well as from project to project as the 
location changes. Alternative management strategies are easily assessed as part of the design 
and uncertainty is easily examined. The trade-offs of alternative management options can be 
represented within the BN-RRM. This means that non-gene drive interventions can be modeled 
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alongside the use of a gene drive or in conjunction with the gene drive, with outcomes 
represented probabilistically.  
1.11 Ten steps of the Bayesian Network-Relative Risk Model 
Ten steps have been described in the development of the relative risk model (Landis and 
Wiegers 2005) and have been further adapted to incorporate Bayesian networks (Ayre and 
Landis 2012). These steps will be used to establish the BN-RRM framework for and calculations 
of risk associated with the release of gene drive engineered mosquitos in Ponce, Puerto Rico. 
Step 1: Explicitly establish the management goals, defining specific endpoint criteria and 
ecological services important for decision makers (Landis and Wiegers 2005). It is imperative for 
the risk assessment process that endpoints be chosen through clear dialogue with all applicable 
stakeholders. Communicating with current management and others through personal contact 
will be essential to this step. 
Step 2: Develop a map that includes the locations of sources and habitats of the areas to be 
treated. This includes the spatial extent of the release of the gene drive engineered mosquitos, 
the land use and land class attributes of the area, suitable mosquito habitat, the distribution of 
human dwellings, as well as any landscape characteristics that may influence migration rates 
and dispersal of the mosquito populations (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 3: Develop risk regions based on spatial connectedness of sources, stressors, habitats, 
and endpoints. Risk regions will be discerned by the ability of the gene drive to persist and 
disperse throughout the study area. This includes all of the landscape characteristics that were 
determined in step 2 (Landis and Wiegers 2005). The determination of risk regions will depend 
on the factors within the landscape that influence mosquito population dynamics and migration 
rates of the organisms, as determined through GIS analyses, and the dispersal rates of the 
11 
 
gene drive throughout the wild type Ae. aegypti population as determined through population 
and gene drive propagation simulations.  
Step 4: Develop a conceptual model that describes the causal linkages between sources, 
stressors, habitats, effects, and impacts. The criteria for inclusion into the conceptual model are 
clearly understood mechanistic properties from exposure to effect (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
This conceptual model serves as the cause-effect framework for the BN-RRM (Ayre and Landis 
2012). 
Step 5: Use the linkages derived in step 4 to create a Bayesian network, including risk rankings 
to calculate risk to specified endpoints. The software Netica™ is used to develop the Bayesian 
network (Norsys 2014). Discrete states (zero, low, medium, or high) are assigned to all nodes 
within the Bayesian network. Higher tiered nodes (parent nodes) that influence lower tiered 
nodes (child nodes) are connected through causal linkages, creating causal chains from 
sources through endpoints. Probability distributions of outcomes for each state, which are 
determined through observations, derived from the literature, or from model output, are 
assigned to the nodes within the Bayesian network. Conditional probability tables are used to 
quantify the causal linkages. The conditional probability tables describe the interactions of all 
possible combinations of each state of the parent nodes that connect to a child node. The 
information built into step 5 is derived from the peer-reviewed literature, government sources, 
expert elicitation and site-specific data (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 6: Calculate risk based on the model output. Risk will be calculated by running the model. 
(Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 7: Conduct model sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. Sensitivity analysis will be done by 
determining the input classifications that are most important changes in risk calculations through 
mutual information. Mutual information is the amount of information that is shared between two 
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nodes in the network. Larger amounts of mutual information between two variables indicates 
that an input variable has more influence on the probability distribution seen in an endpoint node 
(Norsys 2014). Outcomes of sensitivity analysis will illustrate the factors most influential to the 
risk calculations and can identify priorities for increasing accuracy of risk estimates and reducing 
uncertainties in distributions used in step 5 (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 8: Use the model outputs to develop testable hypotheses to enhance knowledge of the 
system. The questions developed will clarify areas of the model needing more information 
(Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 9: Use the hypotheses from step 8 to conduct further research. Testing hypotheses from 
step 8 will create data that can be used to further parameterize the model, resulting in less 
model sensitivity and uncertainty (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
Step 10: Communicate results established through the BN-RRM calculations. Providing results 
of the modeling to decision makers and publishing results in peer-reviewed scientific literature 
will be the top priorities in communicating the outcomes (Landis and Wiegers 2005). 
1.12 Study objectives 
The risk assessment approach proposed by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, 
and Medicine (NASEM 2016) to model the risk posed by gene drives is used here. The goal is 
to show that a quantitative risk assessment of gene drive application as a method to reduce the 
transmission of mosquito borne disease is attainable using realistic landscape characteristics in 
a large metropolitan area and can be easily reproduced for other scenarios involving the use of 
gene drives, given that sufficient data exist regarding: the life history traits of the target species, 
the interactions between the host and vector populations, and the landscape characteristics that 
influence the productivity of the landscape in terms of vector population numbers.  
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1.13 Case study - Ponce, Puerto Rico 
The municipality of Ponce, Puerto Rico is the second most densely populated area in Puerto 
Rico following the greater San Juan area (Figure 1). The Ae. aegypti mosquito is the primary 
vector of concern for mosquito borne disease on the island and within Ponce. This mosquito is 
responsible for the spread of endemic dengue as well as introduced Zika virus (CDC 2017). The 
adaptive management strategies currently in place center on eliminating the larval stages from 
the environment (CDC 2016a, EPA 2016a, b). When larval eradication is not attainable, the use 
of pesticides to control adults is leveraged (EPA 2016a, b). Other measures used are physical 
barriers that limit the exposure of humans to mosquitoes, such as bed nets and window screens 
(EPA 2016a, b). 
Here I model the release of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti and incorporate the findings to 
quantitatively assess the direct and indirect effects of their use. The landscape characteristics of 
Ponce, Puerto Rico provide the information regarding the habitat parameters of the wild and 
subsequent hybrid populations. The connectivity of the habitat describes the movement of the 
gene drive throughout the population. Habitat connectivity as determined through published 
mosquito dispersal patterns and GIS analyses of distances between habitat patches will 
influence the spread of resistance to the drive that develops in one patch and the rates of the 
developed resistance spreading to other patches, until a new resistant population has replaced 
the wild type population. 
The emergence of resistance is a highly advantageous trait in the presence of the extreme 
selective pressure posed by the gene drive and almost assuredly occurs (Unckless et al. 2017). 




Figure 1. Map showing the boundary of the municipality of Ponce, Puerto Rico. 
 
DNA is repaired using an identical DNA sequence as a template (Gratz et al. 2014). By using an 
identical sequence as a repair template, the breakage can be repaired very precisely. In 
contrast, non-homologous end-joining occurs when a double strand break in a segment of DNA 
is repaired by the addition of compatible nucleotides to each end of the break that are then 
fused together (Weterings & Chen 2008). This can result in the loss of nucleotides at a specific 
locus. These inaccurate repairs due to non-homologous end-joining can give rise to the 
formation of alleles that give resistance to the gene drive (Unckless et al. 2017). 
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The habitat patch where resistance develops is a source of further resistance, given that the 
initially resistant organisms successfully breed and reach the minimum viable population size 
required within that patch (Deines et al. 2005). Large areas of suitable habitat for the resistant 
individuals become available for recolonization as the gene drive decreases the wild-type 
population because the habitat requirements between the two are identical. The entire study 
area represents a patchy metapopulation because of the spatial heterogeneity of the 
environment (Deines et al. 2005). Resources are located in discrete locations correlating with 
distributions of human habitations that subdivides the existing mosquito population into discrete 
patches (Lutambi et al. 2013) and dispersal of the resistant individuals is able to occur through 
migration between patches (Deines et al. 2005). 
1.14 Current management strategies 
The current mosquito management strategy in Puerto Rico, implemented by the Puerto Rico 
Vector Control Unit, is a three-pronged integrative pest management approach based on 
reduction of breeding habitat, introduction and maintenance of barriers to movement, and the 
use of pesticides to control larval and adult stages when reduction of breeding habitat is not 
feasible (CDC 2016a, CDC 2016b). The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
recommends the control of mosquito populations primarily at the larval stage when populations 
are most vulnerable. The use of larvicides focuses on treating breeding habitat in order to 
reduce maturation into adult life stages and dispersal (EPA 2016a). Currently, the EPA and the 
World Health Organization approve the use of organophosphate insecticides, insect growth 
inhibitors, and bacterial insecticides for use as mosquito larvicides (EPA 2016a; WHO 2017). 
Organophosphate larvicides cause mortality in mosquito larvae by interfering with nerve 
transmission (CDC 2016a). Organophosphates are recommended as larvicides over pyrethroids 
in order to avoid the development of pyrethroid resistance in larval mosquitos. Due to the wide 
variety of suitable breeding habitat for the Aedes spp. mosquitos and the difficulty in eliminating 
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all sources of standing water, use of larvicides is recommended as an integrated part of a more 
comprehensive mosquito control program (CDC 2016a).  
Insect growth inhibitor larvicides obstruct developmental processes in larval mosquitos, 
effectively reducing adult mosquito populations. This class of chemicals mimics juvenile insect 
hormones and interferes with larval development (EPA 2001). 
Bacterial insecticides include Bacillus thuringiensis iraelensis and Bacillus spaericus. Spores of 
the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis iraelensis create toxins that are detrimental to mosquito, 
blackfly, and fungus gnat larvae. Bacillus sphaericus is a bacterium that produces spores that 
inhibits the digestive processes in the gut of mosquito larvae (EPA 2016a). 
Mosquito adulticides target adult mosquito populations and can be applied through aerial or 
truck mounted spraying. The EPA lists 2 classes of adulticides for use: organophosphates and 
synthetic pyrethroids (EPA 2016b). 
The organophosphate insecticides approved by the EPA are malathion, temephos and Naled 
(1,2-dibromo-2,2-dichloroethylphosphate). These chemicals are neurotransmitter inhibitors that 
work by interfering with the acetylcholinesterase receptor. Malathion is primarily applied with 
truck-mounted sprayers (EPA 2016c). Naled is primarily applied aerially with ultra-low volume 
sprayers. Temephos is applied directly to water sources to control the larval stage. Unlike 
malathion, resistance to Naled or temephos in Ae. aegypti has not been detected (Del Rio-
Galvin et al. 2016; EPA 2016c; EPA 2018).  
The pyrethroid class of insecticides approved by the EPA for use as mosquito adulticides are 
applied by ultra-low volume aerial spraying (EPA 2019). Pyrethroids approved for use in Puerto 
Rico include: alpha-cypermethrin, bifenthrin, deltamethrin, etofenprox, lambda-cyhalothrin, 
permethrin, phenothrin, and tetramethrin (CDC 2017). These chemicals kill adult mosquitos 
through paralysis via neurotransmitter disruption (Soderlund et al. 2002). Synthetic pyrethroid 
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adulticides are used in conjunction with synergistic compounds (e.g. piperonyl butoxide) that 
enhance toxicity (EPA 2019). 
Sterile insect technique is another management option that results in non-viable embryos 
produced from wild-type females (Soderlund et al. 2002). Sterile insect technique releases 
laboratory reared sterile males that are treated with radiation to induce chromosomal 
breakages. When released into wild pest populations the embryos produced when sterile insect 
technique males are mated with wild-type females are non-viable (Soderlund et al. 2002). 
2 METHODS 
2.1 Scenario development 
Amid the Zika epidemic of 2015-2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
and the Puerto Rico Science, Technology and Research Trust established the Puerto Rico 
Vector Control Unit as the implementation arm of the integrative pest management strategy for 
Puerto Rico (CDC 2016b). The Puerto Rico Vector Control Unit is tasked with the 
implementation of control strategies that will reduce mosquito populations with the goals of 
eliminating the Ae. aegypti mosquito and reducing mosquito borne disease transmission (CDC 
2016b). This private entity was largely born out of a workshop hosted by the Puerto Rico 
Science, Technology and Research Trust that concluded the Ae. aegypti mosquito, the primary 
vector for dengue, Zika, and chikungunya, could be eliminated through an integrated pest 
management strategy that leverages reducing breeding habitat, the usage of window screens 
and bed nets, and the applications of pesticides (CDC 2016b). This study models the existing 
management options plus the addition of simulated gene drive releases to model the outcomes 
in relation to management goals. 
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2.2 Site conditions 
The municipality of Ponce, Puerto Rico, covers an area of 297 km2 (Figure 1). The U.S. Census 
lists the population as 140,859 people. The population density of the municipality of Ponce is 
474 persons/km2. Ponce, Puerto Rico is composed of rural, urban, and suburban landscapes 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2019). The Caribbean Sea borders the southern section of the 
municipality and there is a large global shipping port within the Ponce Bay. The Köppen-Geiger 
climate classification of Ponce, Puerto Rico, is tropical, savannah (Beck et al. 2018), the region 
receives on average 935 mm of rainfall per year and has an average temperature of 26.2°C, 
with seasonal highs of both temperature and precipitation in the late-summer and fall months 
(SERCC 2007). Since 2015 there have been 2,791 reported cases of Zika in Ponce, Puerto 
Rico (CDC 2019b; ArboNET 2019). Of these cases, 2,788 cases have been locally transmitted 
and 3 cases have been due to patients returning from travel. Puerto Rico has experienced 
dengue outbreaks since 1963 (CDC 2019b). There have been 1,287 reported cases of dengue 
in Ponce, Puerto Rico since 2010, all cases have been reported as locally transmitted (ArboNET 
2019). 
2.3 Gene drive applications: Population replacement and population suppression 
Although several applications of gene drives have been proposed, they nearly all fall under two 
main categories, population replacement or population suppression (Leftwich et al. 2018). 
Population replacement gene drives introduce a trait into the target population that would be 
driven to dominance over successive generations, effectively replacing the wild population with 
a subsequent population exhibiting the introduced trait. Population suppression drives would 
introduce a trait into the wild population that would incur a fitness reduction in the individuals 
that carried that trait, leading to overall population crashes and eventual extinction of the target 
population (Leftwich et al. 2018). The gene drive constructs discussed in greater detail within 
this research fall under the population suppression category and are modeled after the construct 
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developed by Hammond et al. (2016). The theoretical improvements to the resistance allele 
generation rates suggested through the use of multiple guide-RNA sequences are also modeled 
(Marshall et al. 2017). 
Multiplexing uses multiple guide-RNA sequences within the CRISPR/Cas9 complex to target 
multiple locations on the genome as introduction sites of the gene drive (Marshall et al. 2017). 
Gene drives that use multiplexing would target multiple locations on the genome thereby 
reducing the probability of resistance generating to the drive because resistance would have to 
develop simultaneously at each location. As the number of locations that the multiplexed gene 
drive targets increases, the theorized rate of resistance generation is decreased exponentially 
(Marshall et al. 2017; Noble et al. 2017). 
The population suppression gene drive system that provided the basis for the gene drive 
modeled within this study was developed by Hammond et al. (2016). This system was first 
engineered for use in Drosophila melanogaster and successfully demonstrated in the malaria 
vector Anopheles gambiae. The Hammond et al. (2016) gene drive selected haplosufficient 
female sterility genes and disrupted their normal expression through gene knockout. 
Haplosufficiency occurs when a single copy of a functional gene is sufficient to maintain the 
same normal functions as those seen in individuals carrying two copies of the gene. Females 
that were homozygous for the gene drive were sterile and failed to lay eggs. The heterozygous 
females did not incur any fitness reduction (Hammond et al. 2016). 
2.4 Endpoint selection 
The BN-RRM requires the selection of endpoints that includes the entity being examined and a 
specific attribute or characteristic of the entity that can be measured (Landis & Wiegers 1997; 
Landis & Wiegers 2005). Endpoints selected are the likelihood of reductions in dengue and Zika 
transmission as a result of population reductions due to the simulated releases of the gene drive 
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engineered Ae. aegypti and the development of resistance to the drive. The first endpoint is the 
eradication of the wild type mosquito and is defined as zero remaining Ae. aegypti within the 
study area. Eradication is shown as an intermediate node in the Bayesian network because 
eradication proved to be unlikely depending on the resistance allele generation rate. The 
second endpoint, development of resistance to the drive is defined as the proportion of 
remaining mosquitoes surviving after the releases of the gene drive have ceased in terms of 
relative proportionality from 0 to 1. The third endpoint, the likelihood of reduction in dengue 
transmission is defined as the probability of being below the dengue transmission threshold of 
1.42 pupae/person at a temperature of 28°C (as developed in Focks et al. 2000). The fourth 
endpoint node, Zika transmission, is the likelihood of the remaining Ae. aegypti densities being 
below the transmission threshold of 0.2 females/trap/day (as developed in Barrera et al. 2016). 
2.5 Wild-type mosquito population numbers 
The relationship between landscape characteristics and existing mosquito population numbers 
were incorporated from a previous study conducted in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Barrera et al. 
2019). Barrera et al. (2019) found that the land class of the areas surrounding San Juan were 
significantly correlated with the abundance of existing Ae. aegypti populations. They based their 
study off of CDC trapping data using the BG-2 Sentinel mosquito traps at 59 locations in San 
Juan city from October to November, 2017. Although San Juan city is on the northern edge of 
Puerto Rico and Ponce is on the southern edge, the two areas do share similarities. The 
municipality of Ponce is the second most populated area of Puerto Rico, following the greater 
San Juan area. In both regions there exists a strong north-south urban concentration gradient, 
including elevation gains found as distance from the coast is increased. The five types of land 
class examined were high-density housing, low-density housing, forest, non-forest vegetation, 
and wetlands (Barrera et al. 2019). The linear modeling estimates for Ae. aegypti abundance 
that were found using the BG-S Sentinel trapping data per land class were: high-density 
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housing = 3.4 ± 0.4097 (females/trap/day), low-density housing = 9.8 ± 1.1 (females/trap/day), 
forest = 2.6 ± 1.0 (females/trap/day), non-forest vegetation = 2.7 ± 0.5 (females/trap/day), and 
wetlands = 2.1 ± 0.3 (females/trap/day) (Barrera et al. 2019). 
To obtain existing mosquito population estimates within Ponce, I evaluated several landscape 
characteristics: the extent of the patchiness of the landscape, the existing wild type mosquito 
populations, and the human population of the study area. Since the Ae. aegypti mosquito 
preferentially feeds on humans, it is found primarily in and around human habitations, although 
the importance of non-dwelling buildings as sources of mosquito breeding habitat has been 
noted (Barrera et al. 2006). Because of the relative importance of any building type as potential 
for breeding and the ability of the Ae. aegypti mosquito to use highly cryptic containers as 
breeding habitat, I analyzed a GIS layer that included all of the buildings within the municipality 
of Ponce, available from the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (2020). This shapefile was 
converted from polygons to points to show the locations of all buildings within Ponce. The flight 
and dispersal distance of Ae. aegypti within Puerto Rico was suggested to be within a maximum 
range of 100m (Harrington et al. 2005; Cox et al. 2007). However, the Ae. aegypti mosquito has 
been demonstrated as exhibiting leptokurtic dispersal. This right-tailed dispersal distribution 
means that although most mosquitoes do not travel very far over their lifetime, long distance 
dispersal has been seen (Harrington et al. 2005). To determine the extent of the habitat 
patches, I measured the distances between the major groupings of building points and 
characterized patches based on buildings being separated by either a major barrier (e.g. 
highways, or water channel) or by being separated by distances of over 100m. This resulted in 
there being 36 distinct habitat patches within the municipality of Ponce. The distances between 
patches were also used in conjunction with mark-recapture data gathered in Puerto Rico to 




Risk regions (RR1, RR2, and RR3) were developed by examining the flight distance between 
patches and the dominant landcover classification for each set of landscape patches that were 
included in each region (Figure 2). RR1 was predominantly high-density housing and was 
bounded by a navigable channel to the East, and a major highway to the North. RR2 was mixed 
high-density housing and forest and was bounded by a major highway to the South, the border 
of the municipality of Ponce to the East, and mountains to the North. RR3 was composed of 
mainly forest and patches of low-density housing and was characterized by the strong North-
South series of valleys extending to the Northern border of the municipality. 
Existing mosquito population estimates were obtained by combining the Ae. aegypti abundance 
estimates of the Barrera et al. (2019) study with my GIS analysis of the existing landscape 
characteristics of Ponce (Table 1). A shapefile available from the National Land Cover Database 
(NLCD 2016) was used to quantify the amount of the 5 major land classes used in the 
abundance models of the Barrera et al. (2019) study: high-density housing, low-density housing, 
forest, non-forest vegetation, and wetlands. A 100m buffer surrounding the building points was 
created and used to clip the landcover dataset so that the dominant land cover classification of 
each distinct patch was defined. Once each patch was defined by its dominant landcover 
classification, the amount of buildings per patch and the abundance equations per land class 
were used to estimate the maximum number of existing wild mosquito population for each patch 
(Barrera et al. 2019).  
Table 1. Human population and maximum mosquito population estimate per risk region. 
Risk Region Human population (persons) 
Ae. aegypti maximum mosquito population 
estimate (individuals) 
RR1 113,430 80,200 
RR2 38,629 23,200 





Figure 2. Map showing the locations of all buildings, habitat classification, and human 
populations within each risk region (RR1, RR2, and RR3) within the study area. 
2.6 Disease transmission thresholds 
Mathematical epidemiological models date back to the 1700s (Bernoulli 1760). This early work 
was further developed by Hamer (1906) to describe the mass action principle, that the rate of 
the spread of a contagion is dependent on the number of immunologically susceptible 
individuals within a population and the number of infected individuals. Kermack and McKendrick 
(1927) expounded upon these early models to describe the idea that a population density 
threshold within a population exists that limits the spread of a contagion, relative to the infectivity 
rate of the contagion. With the idea of threshold theory, an increase in contagious individuals or 
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vectors into a population does not lead to an epidemic unless the overall density of the 
immunologically naïve population is above a critical threshold (Kermack and McKendrick 1927; 
Focks et al. 2000). 
2.7 Dengue transmission threshold 
Focks et al. (2000) coupled the mathematical threshold theory with computer simulation models 
to develop threshold levels for dengue as a function of pupae per person, herd immunity (initial 
seroprevalence), temperature, and the magnitude of viral introduction (Table 2). Focks et al. 
(2000) describe the dengue thresholds in terms of pupae per person for 3 main reasons: pupae 
are readily available to count, the Aedes subgenus Stegomyia can be easily separated from 
other container inhabiting organisms, and because of the research correlating the number of 
pupae to the number of adult individuals.  
Table 2. Dengue transmission thresholds (pupae/person) per temperature and level of herd 
immunity. Adapted from Focks et al. (2000). 
Temperature Herd Immunity 
Dengue Transmission Threshold 
(pupae/person) 
22 0 9.57 
24 0 2.92 
26 0 1.42 
28 0 0.53 
30 0 0.13 
32 0 0.07 
22 33 14.1 
24 33 4.47 
26 33 2.03 
28 33 0.75 
30 33 0.19 
32 33 0.1 
22 67 30.55 
24 67 9.22 
26 67 4.26 
28 67 1.69 
30 67 0.38 
32 67 0.26 
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The temperature of the environment influences the number of adult female mosquitoes and the 
number of pupae (Focks et al. 2000). In general, as temperature increases the length of the 
gonotrophic cycle decreases, resulting in higher rates of emergence from pupae to adult (Focks 
et al. 2000). Temperature also influences the incubation period of the dengue virus. Infected 
mosquitoes become able to transmit dengue faster at higher temperatures (Focks et al. 2000). 
2.8 Zika threshold 
Barrera et al. (2017) developed transmission threshold levels for Chikungunya in Puerto Rico. 
Chikungunya is another viral disease that is vectored by the Ae. aegypti mosquito. The first 
reported case of chikungunya was confirmed in Puerto Rico in May of 2014. The first confirmed 
case of Zika virus in Puerto Rico occurred in 2015 (Barrera et al. 2017). Though chikungunya 
and Zika viruses are different families of viral infections they are both primarily spread by the 
same vector, both share similar transmission cycles, and both were introduced into a 
serologically naïve population (Barrera et al. 2017). The co-occurrence of dengue, chikungunya, 
and Zika virus suggests that the areas that have been impacted by dengue and chikungunya 
are also at risk of being impacted by Zika virus. Therefore, the use of chikungunya transmission 
thresholds would be prohibitive to the spread of Zika and an appropriate proxy for Zika 
transmission thresholds (Barrera et al. 2017). The Zika transmission thresholds estimated in 
Barrera et al. (2017) were developed through comparing mosquito trapping data in several 
areas in Puerto Rico and comparing the rates of antibody presence in the human populations. 
Although thresholds for Zika will vary with temperature similarly as with dengue thresholds, the 
Zika threshold values in the Barrera et al. (2017) study were developed and reported with no 
specificity to temperature (Focks et al. 2000; Barrera et al. 2017).  
2.9 Case learning 
Case learning can be used within the Bayesian networks created with Netica™ to automatically 
construct the conditional probability tables that describe the likely occurrences of a specific 
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variable (Norsys 2014). Case learning in Netica™ is the process where the software performs 
probabilistic inference on a set of case data where each entry (case) describes one outcome of 
an event. This process automatically generates the values for the conditional probability tables 
that describes the outcomes of the set of variables (nodes) included in the Bayesian network 
that cause the event (Norsys 2014). To parameterize nodes within the model using case 
learning, case files must be created that include each measurement of interest for each of the 
variables (nodes) that are being described. The case files I used for case learning within my 
Bayesian networks describe the outcomes of each of the gene drive release simulations. Input 
parameters include the resistance generation rate, the duration of releases (weeks), and the 
release ratio. The nodes that the conditional probability tables are parameterized using case 
learning are the ‘Resulting Pop. After GD Release’ and ‘Proportion of GD Resistance’ nodes. 
The case files included the allele frequencies and population numbers for each patch per time 
point. 
2.10 Interaction with pesticide applications 
The effects of pesticide application are modeled within the Bayesian network through the 
incorporation of dose-response modeling within the pesticide application node. Four pyrethroid 
pesticides and DDT were incorporated. The likely impacts of these pesticides on adult Ae. 
aegypti after the release of the gene drive can be shown by selecting the specific pesticide and 
amount to be applied (mols). The impacts on remaining populations are shown via the percent 
reduction due to the application of the various pesticides.  
3. Model Structure 
3.1 Conceptual model 
A general cause-effect conceptual model adapted from Landis (2004) by NASEM (2016) was 
developed to map out the causal pathways that there is a mechanistic understanding of, that 
link the release of the gene drive engineered mosquitoes and the incidence of disease within 
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the study area (Figure 3). Each component of the conceptual model is linked to the study area 
through a spatial component. The conceptual model is composed of the sources of the 
stressors, the stressors themselves, the characteristics of the habitat, the direct and indirect 
effects, and the impacts to the defined endpoints.  
Once the general conceptual model was created a simplified version was created that lists the 
specific causal pathways which includes only the items that I was able to quantify and were to 
be included within the Bayesian networks (Marcot et al. 2006; Chen and Pollino 2012; Landis et 
al. 2020). The simplification was done to only represent the cause-effect relationships of 
stressor to endpoint where data and research regarding the mechanistic interactions was 
available (Figure 4). A table of items included in the simplified conceptual model and the 
resulting Bayesian networks, as well as data sources, is included in appendix 5. 
Source. The source column of the conceptual model lists the spatially explicit parameters of the 
release of the gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti mosquitoes. To introduce the gene drive 
engineered organism there will be multiple release points throughout the study area that are 
based on the migration rates between patches as estimated through GIS analyses in 
conjunction with known dispersal rates (Harrington et al. 2005). Other components describing 
the release of the gene drive into the target population include the number of organisms to be 
released, the timing of release, the interval of time between releases, and the overall amount of 
releases of the gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti.  
Stressor. The stressor column includes the characteristics of the specific genetic construct that 
makes up the gene drive. The homing rate of the drive mechanism (the rate at which the 
CRISPR/Cas9 complex successfully finds the target sequence), the cutting rate of the drive 
mechanism (the rate of the CRISPR/Cas9 complex successfully causing a double-strand break 
in the segment of DNA), and the resistance allele generation rate are all components that will 




Figure 3. Conceptual model for the BN-RRM assessment of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti 
as vectors to control dengue and Zika virus. 
 
Figure 4. Simplified version of the conceptual model including only the items that are 
incorporated into the Bayesian network. Incorporation into the Bayesian network structure is 
dependent on mechanistic understandings of the causal interactions taking place between items 
on the conceptual model (Chen and Pollino 2007; Marcot 2017; Landis et al. 2020). 
release of the gene drive into the target population. Other stressors within the study area 
include the pesticides that are currently approved for use and other current mosquito 
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management efforts being conducted that may impact the dispersal of the gene drive. For 
example, extensive pesticide application could result in the engineered mosquitoes being killed 
before they can successfully mate and pass on the gene drive to their progeny, or extensive 
reductions in the amount of standing water around habitations would result in a lack of breeding 
habitat, potentially hindering the breeding success and dispersal of the gene drive within the 
target population. 
Habitat. The land classes and land use within the study area will be listed in the habitat column. 
The key component here is to understand the exposure of the target population to the gene 
drive. This will include the abundance of the existing wild type mosquitoes, the productivity of 
each associated land class, and the spatial extent of where the mosquitoes breed and forage. 
Effect. The effects include the direct and indirect effects resulting from the release of the gene 
drive Ae. aegypti into the environment. Effects of the release will include the relative frequency 
of the gene drive construct in the population, any changes in population size and population 
dynamics, and any resulting fitness cost that may result from hybridization between wild and 
gene drive mosquitoes. Agricultural and ecological effects resulting from any reduction in 
mosquito populations as a result of the drive are not to be excluded and remain as items within 
this more comprehensive conceptual model. 
Impact. The impact to our defined endpoints resulting from the release of the gene drive into the 
environment will include the number of viable disease vectors, rates of disease incidence, and 
any reduction in disease morbidity and mortality. Alterations to ecological structure or food web 
interactions, as well as any reduction of agricultural productivity resulting from release of the 
gene drive are included as potential impacts associated with the agricultural and ecological 
effects pathways that are generalized within the comprehensive conceptual model. 
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3.2 Development of the gene drive specific Bayesian network relative risk model 
The conceptual model provides the basic framework for the development of our Bayesian 
network and reflects the cause-effect relationships between the variables that are included 
(Ayre and Landis 2012; see Figures 4 & 5). The underlying mathematical driving force of the 
Bayesian network is the relationships between variables that are described within the 
conditional probability tables for each distinct node within the network (Cain et al. 1999; Marcot 
et al. 2006). Each conditional probability table lists the likely outcomes of each combination of 
input variables in terms of probabilities.  
The probability distributions defining the likelihood of outcomes to Ae. aegypti populations as a 
result of the simulated releases of the gene drive engineered mosquitoes will be developed from 
output from the Mosquito Gene Drive Explorer Model (MGDrivE) and is described in detail 
below (Sánchez et al. 2019). Landscape data resulting from GIS analyses were incorporated to 
fill out the nodes that represent source and habitat characteristics. Dengue transmission 
threshold levels from Focks et al. (2000) were used to develop the conditional probability table 
for the reduction in dengue node. The mosquito abundance estimates resulting from the gene 
drive dispersal model and the human population densities of the risk regions were used to 
determine the likelihood of dengue transmission in terms of pupae per person. Zika thresholds 
were developed in Barrera et al. (2017) in terms of female mosquitoes per building and were 
used with the mosquito abundance estimates resulting from the gene drive propagation 
modeling output to determine the relative number of female mosquitoes per building per region 
which resulted in the risk estimates for Zika transmission. 
3.3 Modeling of gene drive propagation 
To model the release of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti into Ponce, Puerto Rico I used the 




Figure 5. Bayesian network model structure for risk estimation of gene drive releases at the maximum simulation time (6.75 years). 
The parameters selected are for RR1, a release ratio of 1:1, rate of accurate HDR of 0.999, and 13 weekly releases. Dengue 
transmission thresholds are based on 0% herd immunity and a temperature of 26°C (Focks et al. 2000). 
   ae
 
  to    
    to     
     to     
     to      . 
 .  
 .  
 .  
  . 
  . 
            














 i     
     to      
      to      
      to      
      to      
      to      





  . 
 .  
            




   
 
  . 




  i  i  s
    
    
     
 
 
   
         
 es  ti         ter     e ease
 
  to    
    to     
     to     
     to      
      to      
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
  . 
             
    rate    
 .   
 .    
 .     
 .     




 .   








 e ease  ati 
one to one
three to one
f ive to one
   
 
 
    
 r   rti          esista  e
  to  .  
 .   to  .  
 .   to  .  
 .   to  
 .  
 .  
 .  
  . 
 .       .  




   
 
 
   a       ati  
     
     
      
.   
.   
  . 
             








 e   e Thresh        ae  ers   
 .  
 . 
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
  . 
  .  
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
  . 
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
.   
 .      .  
   ae  er  ers  
  to  . 
 .  to  . 
 .  to  . 
 .  to   
  . 
  . 
  . 
 .  
 .      
 e   e e   ti  
 elow  threshold
At threshold
A ove threshold
  . 
 .  
  . 
 .  e     . e 





  . 
  . 
  . 
  . 




Figure 6. Bayesian network model structure for risk estimation of gene drive releases at the time point to minimum overall population 
per release scenario. The parameters selected are for RR1, a release ratio of 1:1, rate of accurate HDR of 0.999, and 13 weekly 
releases. Dengue transmission thresholds are based on 0% herd immunity and a temperature of 26°C (Focks et al. 2000). Pesticide 
application as an additional management strategy is included. 
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 (Sánchez et al. 2019). MGDrivE is a spatially explicit mathematical simulation framework that 
models the deployment of gene drive engineered mosquitoes and their effect on population 
dynamics. The MGDrivE modeling framework was designed to model the spread of a variety of 
gene drive architectures through spatially explicit mosquito populations. MGDrivE incorporates 
lumped age-class ecological modeling with genetic information and site-specific spatial 
dynamics. MGDrivE allows the user to input specific life-history parameters of the target 
population including the developmental stages: egg, larvae, pupae, and adult. Patches within 
the simulated release landscape are represented with a metapopulation structure, with used 
defined rates of migration between patches. Within MGDrivE, genetic inheritance of gene drives 
is modeled using ‘inheritance cu es’ that descri e the maternal and paternal genetic information 
which results in the genetic composition of any offspring. The MGDrivE modeling framework 
allows the user to define specific characteristics of the gene drive that is being simulated. These 
gene drive characteristics include the correct homing rate and the rates of resistance allele 
generation (Sánchez et al. 2019). Rates of both in-frame and out-of-frame resistance (Marshall 
et al. 2017; Unckless et al. 2017) are able to be modeled within MGDrivE. In-frame resistance is 
resistance generation that affects only the functionality of the gene drive, with no related fitness 
reduction as a result. Out-of-frame resistance imparts resistance to the gene drive while also 
affecting some other conserved portion of DNA resulting in a substantial fitness reduction 
(Sánchez et al. 2019).  
Mosquito life history is modeled within MGDrivE by a lump age-class model, in which the 
different life stages of the mosquito as incorporated: egg, larvae, pupae, and adult (Sánchez et 
al. 2019). Density dependence is modeled in the larval stage to account for larval competition 
within breeding sites. Density independent mortality is modeled in the juvenile and adult life 
stages. Spatial dynamics of the simulated release area are incorporated through a migration 
matrix that lists the probability of an individual in one patch migrating to an adjacent patch at 
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each timestep (day). The population of each distinct patch is simulated as randomly mating 
(Sánchez et al. 2019). 
MGDrivE can be run as a deterministic or stochastic modeling framework, with the stochastic 
simulations accounting for random chance events that may occur when patch densities become 
low. Monte Carlo iterations of each simulated release can be implemented to capture the full 
range of possible outcomes as a result of the simulated releases (Sánchez et al. 2019).  
3.4 Simulation parameters 
I ran 36 different stochastic simulation scenarios for various deployments of gene drives using 
the MGDrivE modelling framework (Sánchez et al. 2019). The parameters were primarily 
focused on the initial release parameters of the engineered organisms, the homing rate of the 
gene drive construct, and the rate of resistance allele generation. I accounted for the spatial 
uniqueness of the landscape of Ponce by incorporating estimated migration rates into the 
migration matrix within the model. Each stochastic simulation was repeated 50 times to ensure 
that the range of outcomes was accounted for.  
To determine the patches that received the simulated weekly releases of gene drive engineered 
Ae. aegypti, I developed a matrix of migration rates based on GIS analyses of mosquito 
dispersal and flight distance relative to spatial locations of patches (Harrington et al. 2005). 
Patches with less than 4% migration probability to adjacent patches were chosen as release 
patches, as well as the patches that made up our primary “mainland” patch. Too account for the 
right-tailed skew in dispersal distances noted in previous studies (Harrington et al. 2005), 
patches that were beyond the 100m range but within a reasonably unimpeded flight path were 
assigned the minimum probability of migration (1%). This resulted in 24 patches designated as 
release patches. The study area represents a patchy metapopulation of wild Ae. aegypti 
(Deines et al. 2005). This release scheme is comparable to the introduction of an invasive 
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species and was chosen so that the released gene drive organisms would have a high 
probability of radiating throughout the study area. Because of the patchiness of the study area 
multiple release locations were chosen to increase the probability of the spread of the 
introduced gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti. This reduces the probability of chance 
occurrences that would result in certain patches being effectively cut off from the spread of the 
gene drive due to low migration rates (Deines et al. 2005). If the gene drive does not spread 
throughout the target population and reduce the vector densities there will be no impacts to 
disease transmission. 
The parameters surrounding the initial release of the gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti were 
the number of engineered organisms released, the locations of releases, the interval of time 
between releases, and the duration of the scheduled releases (Table 3).  
Table 3. MGDrivE release parameters. Each combination of parameters was modeled giving 36 
individual release scenarios that were repeated 50 times per simulation. 
Rate of accurate 
homology-directed repair 
Release ratio Duration of releases (weeks) 
0.001 1:1 13 
0.0001 3:1 26 
0.00005 5:1 39 
0.00001   
   
The release ratios were chosen to be similar to previous modeling efforts (Robert et al. 2014; 
Pham et al. 2019; and Sánchez et al. 2020). These previous studies modeled the release ratios 
of gene drive engineered organisms to wild type organisms. Ratios included ranged from 1:1 to 
10:1. I chose an intermediate range of simulated release ratios, including 1:1 (3,340 males 
released), 5:1 (10,021 males released), and 5:1 (16,702 males released). These release ratios 
show the effect of the gene drive resulting from a range of inundation in terms of release ratio. 
A model burn-in period of 1 year was used to allow for the simulated wild mosquito populations 
per patch to stabilize due to the various migration probabilities between adjacent patches. The 
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different release durations that I included were 13, 26, and 39 weeks, simulating 1 release every 
week starting on simulation day 366. These release durations were chosen based on previous 
modeling efforts which had similar numbers of weekly releases (Robert et al. 2014; Pham et al. 
2019; and Sánchez et al. 2020). 
The total number of simulated gene drive engineered mosquitoes was the product of variations 
in release ratio (1:1, 3:1, and 5:1), duration of weekly releases (13, 26, and 39 weeks), and the 
number of patches receiving releases (24 patches). This resulted in 9 separate values for total 
number of engineered male Ae. aegypti released over the simulation periods. Complete range 
of released engineered mosquitoes over entire simulation period by release scenario is given in 
table 4. 
The successful homing rate of the simulated gene drive was assumed to be 95%, which is the 
rate demonstrated in Hammond et al. (2016). The rate of accurate homology directed repair 
(HDR) was simulated at levels of: 0.999, 0.9999, 0.99995 and 0.99999.  The inverse of these 
rates was used to simulate the resistance allele generation developing as a result of the drive, 
giving us resistance generation rates ranging from 0.001 to 0.00001. The gene drive construct 
described in Hammond et al. (2016) designed for population suppression of the malaria vector 
Anopheles gambiae showed rates of resistance generation of approximately 0.0013. Marshall et 
al. (2017) modeled the effects of decreasing the rates of resistance allele generation through 
multiplexing (from 10-3 to 10-7) to determine the maximum size of the wild populations of 
mosquitoes that could be suppressed for each rate of resistance generation. I chose to model 
the rates of resistance generation of gene drive constructs that have been lab tested (Hammond 
et al. 2016) and a moderate level of resistance proposed by Marshall et al. (2017) through the 
theoretical use of multiplexing. 
To develop the amount of Monte Carlo iterations used, I ran preliminary MGDrivE simulations, 
increasing the value of repetitions. When comparing the results, I found that n=50 was suitable 
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to capture the range of possible outcomes and to stabilize the resulting outcome distributions to 
convergence. Time series plots of the results showed convergence was well established after 
approximately 1,500 simulation days. Specific statistical measures of the mean, standard 
deviation, and 95% confidence intervals of outcomes were not included and the value was 
based largely on visual interpretation of convergence within the preliminary results. 
Table 4. Total numbers of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti released over the entire simulation 
period for each combination of release parameters. A total of 24 out of 36 patches were chosen 
to receive simulated releases based on migration rates between patches. If a patch had less 
than 4% probability of migration it was chosen as a release patch. 
Release 
ratio 
Duration of releases 
(weeks) 
# of patches receiving 
releases 
Total GD released during 
simulation period 
1:1 13 24 1,042,080 
1:1 26 24 2,084,160 
1:1 39 24 3,126,240 
3:1 13 24 3,126,552 
3:1 26 24 6,253,104 
3:1 39 24 9,379,656 
5:1 13 24 5,211,024 
5:1 26 24 10,422,048 
5:1 39 24 15,633,072 
3.5 Model analysis 
To understand the full range of outcomes associated with the use of population suppression 
drives I modeled 3 separate management strategies with Bayesian networks: 1) no gene drive 
releases to model the maximum mosquito population estimate and current risk estimates of the 
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landscape, 2) the absolute outcome of the gene drive release (Figure 7) at the end of the 
simulation period, & 3) the time point associated with the largest decrease in population size 
resulting from the various gene drive release simulations that could be used in conjunction with 
other adaptive management strategies (Figure 8). Modeling the maximum mosquito population 
estimate without releases provides a scenario in which I can compare with the remaining two 
release scenarios. The maximum time scenario provided the likelihood of resistance to the drive 
developing, and the likelihood of population rebounds as a result of only the releases of the 
gene drive. The third Bayesian network was built to simulate how non-eradication resulting from 
the gene drive releases could still be used as part of an integrative pest management strategy 
within an adaptive management scheme. 
3.6 Maximum mosquito population simulations 
The maximum mosquito population estimate release scenario was set using the landscape 
characteristics of Ponce to determine the wild type population size, as well as the rates of 
migration between patches. Fifty stochastic simulations were run, each simulating 6.75 years, to 
evaluate the range of possible wild type Ae. aegypti populations within the study area under 
non-intervention scenarios. This modeling effort represents the base mosquito population levels 
that would occur using realistic landscape characteristics. The population densities of 
mosquitoes per region, coupled with the human population densities described the current 
likelihood of disease transmission (Focks et al. 2000; Barrera et al. 2017). 
3.7 Gene drive deployment simulations 
The second Bayesian network created shows the effectiveness of the release of the gene drive 
after 6.75 years (Figure 7). This illustrates how the various release parameters interact to 
impact mosquito populations within the study area. This modeling effort shows the outcomes of 




Figure 7 Bayesian network showing the results of one of the 36 MGDrivE release scenarios within RR1 at the end of the simulation 
period. Release ratio is set to 1:1, the rate of accurate HDR is set to 0.999 to simulate the Hammond et al. (2016) gene drive, 
duration of releases is set to 13 weeks. The dashed line shows the release parameters and risk region selected. The double-solid 
line shows the outcomes of the gene drive release and the percentage of surviving mosquitoes that are resistant to the gene drive. 
The solid line shows the risk estimates to the transmission rates of dengue and Zika. Herd immunity and temperature are selected 




Figure 8. Bayesian network showing the results of one of the 36 MGDrivE release scenarios within RR1 at the time point associated 
with the average lowest possible Ae. aegypti population. Release ratio is set to 1:1, rate of accurate HDR is set to 0.999 to simulate 
the Hammond et al. (2016) gene drive, and the duration of releases is set to 13 weeks. The dashed line shows the release 
parameters and risk region selected. The double-solid line shows the outcomes of the gene drive release and the percentage of 
surviving mosquitoes that are resistant to the gene drive. The solid line shows the risk estimates to the transmission rates of dengue 
and Zika. The circular outline shows the inclusion of pesticide application as an additional management strategy. Herd immunity and 
temperature are selected within this example to represent dengue transmission thresholds at 0% herd immunity within the human 




occurrence, the likelihood of wild population rebounds, the likelihood of gene drive resistance 
developing within the mosquito population resulting in either mixed (wild and resistant) or 
resistant population rebounds, and any impacts on disease transmission due to lowered 
abundance of the vector population. This means that the impact to mosquito population 
abundance can be modeled 
3.8 Gene drive deployment with alternate management strategies 
To show the applicability of the use of gene drives within an adaptive management framework, 
the third Bayesian network integrates a second management intervention taken at the average 
timepoint where the average mosquito populations were lowest within the landscape due to the 
release of the gene drive (Figure 8). To find the time to minimum population for each of the 36 
different release scenarios, the model output from MGDrivE was aggregated per release 
scenario to estimate the timepoint that the average number of mosquitoes within the entire 
study area was at its lowest per release scenarios. Using this subset of the simulation results I 
was able to show the maximum effectiveness, in terms of overall population reduction, of each 
gene drive release and used this to develop the best-case scenario that could be used to guide 
the implementation of alternative mosquito control measures (e.g. pesticides). This approach 
was used because model results showed that extinction is not likely, resistance is highly likely, 
and population rebounds were suggested to occur with high probability for many of the MGDrivE 
release scenarios. Resistance is almost assured to develop as a result of the non-homologous 
end-joining repair mechanism and because of this the likelihood of eradication decreases with 
increased resistance generation rates. If I only examined the results at the end of the simulation 
period, I would only have developed binary results (either the gene drive caused extinction or 
did not) and these results would have had little to no relevance to the human health endpoints 
(either the disease was eradicated along with the mosquitoes or not). 
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3.9 Case learning simulation output 
Case learning was used to construct the conditional probability tables for the nodes within the 
Bayesian networks that describe the propagation of the gene drive throughout the mosquito 
population. The MGDrivE model output was restructured in R to show the numbers of wild and 
resistant mosquitoes per region for each of the different release scenarios. This data was then 
used as case learning data set that Netica™ (Norsys 2014) used to determine the likely 
outcomes of each different combination of release parameters. The case learning dataset 
incorporated each of the fifty Monte Carlo simulations for each of the 36 simulated release 
combinations and were used to model the three management strategies: 1) no intervention, 2) 
the release of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti only, and 3) release of gene drive Ae. aegypti 
and a secondary management intervention. The MGDrivE model output and case learning 
approach were used to build the conditional probability tables for the nodes in the Bayesian 
network that are associated with wild type populations, the resulting populations after the gene 
drive release, and the rates of resistance developing as a result of the gene drive release. 
With case learning, the software uses the observed output and automatically determines the 
relationships between the different input variables to give the probability of different outcomes 
for each combination of input states (Norsys 2014). With large sets of simulation output, like I 
developed with MGDrivE, Netica™ can use case learning to perform probabilistic inference on 
the model output, where each entry describes one outcome.  etica™ used the observed 
MGDrivE output to determine the relationships between the input variables (Norsys 2014). This 
process automatically calculates the values for the conditional probability tables that describe 
the probability distributions for the nodes relating to the release of the gene drive and the 





3.10 Sensitivity Analysis 
Model sensitivity (mutual information or entropy reduction) describes the amount of influence 
that changes in one node can assert on the other nodes within the Bayesian network (Norsys 
2014). This means that the probability distributions of inputs nodes can have more or less 
influence on the probability distributions of the endpoint nodes. The built-in model sensitivity 
analysis within Netica™ provides a framework to understand how the various input nodes affect 
the endpoint nodes. The entropy reduction for each endpoint node can vary depending on the 
location of each node in the Bayesian network being analyzed (Norsys 2014). The nodes I 
examined for entropy reduction were the input nodes describing the release parameters of the 
gene drive, the endpoint nodes for resistance development, dengue and Zika transmission, the 
intermediate node for resulting population after the release of the gene drive, and temperature 
as it is strongly related to the dengue transmission thresholds developed by Focks et al. (2000). 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Maximum simulation time 
To examine what the end result of the release of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti within the 
study area would be, I analyzed the results after our 6.75-year simulations (Table 5). The 
simulation outcomes gave results for each release scheme. Out of all of the simulations only 1 
resistance generation rate resulted in zero extinctions. The simulations modeling the release of 
gene drive mosquitoes modeled after the Hammond et al. (2016) construct with a resistance 
generation rate of 0.001 never resulted in extinction for any combination of release scenarios. 
All other release scenarios showed some level of extinction occurring, but this varied with the 
combinations of the resistance rates, number of weekly releases, and the wild to engineered 
release ratios. Generally, as rates of resistance decreased or ratio and duration increased, the 
likelihood of extinction increased, but not always in a monotonic relationship (Table 5). Of all the 
simulations examined for the maximum simulation time that did not result in extinction, the 
36 
 
surviving mosquito population was composed of individuals resistant to the gene drive due to 
resistance developing through non-homologous end-joining (Unckless et al 2017). General 
trends show that increasing the resistance rate, number of releases, or the release ratio resulted 
in a higher likelihood of extinction occurrence (Table 5). 
For a modeled resistance rate of 0.00001, extinction occurred 4 out 50 times at a release ratio 
of 1:1 and 26 weekly releases and 3 out of 50 for 39 weekly releases. Thirteen weekly releases 
resulted in extinction in only one of 50 simulations at a 3:1 release ratio. Both of the 26 week 
and 39-week release scenarios of a 0.0001 resistance rate and 3:1 ratio resulted in 15 
extinction events out of 50. Increasing the release ratio to 5:1 was most successful at 39 weekly 
releases and caused extinction in 50% of simulations (Table 5). 
When the resistance rate was decreased to 0.00005 the scenarios with 26 weekly releases and 
a 1:1 or 3:1 release ratio were more successful than the 13 or 39 weekly releases. Scenarios 
modeled with a resistance rate of 0.00005 and a 5:1 release ratio caused extinction in 20 
simulations. The highest degree of successfully causing extinction at a resistance rate of 
0.00005 occurred with 26 weekly releases at a 3:1 release ratio (50%) (Table 5). 
Further reducing the resistance generation rate to 0.00001 resulted in the highest likelihood of 
extinction occurring overall. Increasing each release parameter increased the likelihood of 
extinction with the highest occurrence of 47/50 simulations with a 5:1 release ratio and 39 
weekly releases. The shortest duration of 13 weekly releases and the lowest release ratio of 1:1 
resulted in extinction occurring in 29 out of 50 simulations (Table 5). 
4.2 Time to minimum population size 
The results of aggregating the data for the time point coinciding with the lowest overall 
population levels show that all release scenarios drastically reduced the population of 
mosquitoes. Resistance was strongly selected for in the population and the simulations had  
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Table 5. Results of MGDrivE maximum simulation time release scenarios. In general, a 
decrease in resistance generation or an increase in release ratio or duration of releases 
increased the probability of extinction occurring as a result of the gene drive. 
Release ratio Rate of accurate HDR Duration of Release 
1:1 (3,340) 0.001 13 weeks 
3:1 (10,021) 0.0001 26 weeks 
5:1 (16,702) 0.00005 39 weeks 
 0.00001  
Resistance Ratio Duration  Resistance Ratio Duration  Resistance Ratio Duration 
0.0001 1:1 13 weeks  0.0001 1:1 26 weeks 
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varying degrees of resistance development. General trends in the data show that increasing the 
release ratio from 1:1, 3:1, and 5:1 for each combination of resistance development rate and 
number of weekly releases gave an increased reduction in overall mosquito population numbers 
(Table 6). 
The target reduction in Ae. aegypti populations for the Bayesian network modeling only the 
release of the gene drive was 100%. Complete eradication because of the gene drive 
deployment would be necessary to avoid a population rebound of the disease vector with newly 
developed resistance to the gene drive deployed. The target reductions for the Bayesian 
network modeling the use of the gene drive and pesticide application as an additional 
management strategy is based on the percent reduction required for zero Zika transmission. 
The target reduction was 94% for RR1, 93% for RR2, and 92% for RR3. The percent reductions 
would eliminate the spread of any novel disease, like Zika virus, as well as be prohibitive of 
dengue transmission. 
The lowest percent reduction resulting from the parameters resembling the Hammond et al. 
(2016) construct for all levels of scenarios was 76.75% (release ratio = 1:1, weekly releases = 
13). The largest percent reduction of 97.76% followed 26 weekly releases at a 5:1 release ratio. 
Increasing the release ratio increased the percent reduction in population numbers for scenarios 
that included 13 and 26 weekly releases. The opposite was true for scenarios simulating 39 
weekly releases; 97% reduction at 1:1 to 91.26% reduction at 5:1. Of the surviving mosquitoes, 
the % remaining that were resistant to the gene drive varied but was most consistent when 
grouped by weekly releases. Percent resistant at 13 weekly releases were 35.97% at 1:1, 
33.06% at 3:1, and 32.95% at 5:1. The percent resistant at the 26 weekly release level were 
37.76% at 1:1, 33.80% at 3:1, and 36.97 at 5:1. The percent of the total surviving mosquito 
population at the 39 weekly release level were 38.18% at 1:1, 44.04% at 3:1, and 45.12% at 5:1 
weekly releases (Table 6). 
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When decreasing the resistance generation rate of simulations to 0.0001, the lowest percent 
reduction in populations of 88.97% occurred with 13 weekly releases and a 1:1 release ratio. 
This release scenario of 13 weekly releases at a 1:1 ratio also resulted in the highest 
percentage of surviving mosquitoes being resistant to the gene drive; 44.57% of remaining Ae. 
aegypti were resistant. No extinction events resulted from this release scheme. The largest 
reduction in simulated populations of 99.43% of the maximum mosquito population estimate 
resulted from 26 weekly releases at a 5:1 release ratio. The release scenario that resulted in the 
lowest percent of remaining mosquitoes being resistant to the gene drive (23.38% resistant) 
occurred with 13 weekly releases of a 5:1 release ratio (Table 6). 
When further decreasing the resistance generation rate to 0.0005, the scenario that resulted in 
the lowest percent reduction of mosquito populations (90.75%) and highest percent of surviving 
mosquitoes being resistant to the gene drive occurred with 13 weekly releases at a 1:1 release 
ratio. The largest reduction in mosquito populations occurred with 26 weekly releases at a 5:1 
release ratio. The lowest percentage of surviving mosquitoes being resistant to the drive was 
29.04% and resulted from 26 weekly releases at a 1:1 release ratio (Table 6). 
The lowest resistance generation rate simulated was 0.00001. Thirteen weekly releases and a 
1:1 release ratio at this level of resistance generation resulted in a 95.51% reduction in Ae. 
aegypti populations. The largest reduction in population levels of 99.74% occurred with 26 
weekly releases at a 5:1 release ratio. This was the largest percent reduction for any simulation 
across all release parameters. Not surprisingly, this release scenario with the lowest resistance 
generation rate also resulted in the least percentage of surviving mosquitoes being resistant to 
the gene drive; 12.64% of surviving mosquitoes were resistant following 13 weekly releases of a 
5:1 release ratio. The largest release ratio and longest duration of releases at this resistance 
generation rate resulted in 58.33% of surviving mosquitoes to be resistant to the gene drive but 
also had the highest probability of extinction at 94% of simulations (Table 6). 
40 
 
Table 6. Results of MGDrivE minimum simulation time release scenarios. 
Resistance 
rate 
Release ratio Weekly 
releases 
% Reduction % Resistant 
0.001 1:1 13 76.75 35.97 
0.001 3:1 13 89.94 33.06 
0.001 5:1 13 94.10 32.95 
0.001 1:1 26 88.20 37.76 
0.001 3:1 26 96.89 33.80 
0.001 5:1 26 97.76 36.97 
0.001 1:1 39 93.77 38.18 
0.001 3:1 39 93.51 44.04 
0.001 5:1 39 91.26 45.12 
0.0001 1:1 13 88.97 44.57 
0.0001 3:1 13 96.19 35.26 
0.0001 5:1 13 97.51 23.38 
0.0001 1:1 26 94.79 31.94 
0.0001 3:1 26 99.04 43.35 
0.0001 5:1 26 99.43 36.04 
0.0001 1:1 39 97.90 40.70 
0.0001 3:1 39 98.65 42.70 
0.0001 5:1 39 98.30 43.06 
0.00005 1:1 13 90.75 48.99 
0.00005 3:1 13 96.24 41.04 
0.00005 5:1 13 97.97 29.44 
0.00005 1:1 26 96.03 29.04 
0.00005 3:1 26 98.82 32.38 
0.00005 5:1 26 99.42 43.50 
0.00005 1:1 39 98.04 31.41 
0.00005 3:1 39 98.89 46.04 
0.00005 5:1 39 98.29 48.63 
0.00001 1:1 13 95.51 55.12 
0.00001 3:1 13 97.66 25.63 
0.00001 5:1 13 98.10 12.64 
0.00001 1:1 26 97.83 17.68 
0.00001 3:1 26 99.57 17.05 
0.00001 5:1 26 99.74 43.20 
0.00001 1:1 39 99.56 52.20 
0.00001 3:1 39 99.71 53.93 




4.3 Change in risk to human health endpoints 
4.3.1 Maximum simulation time 
The Bayesian network assembled for gene drive deployment in Ponce calculated risk of dengue 
and Zika transmission based on spatial inputs and MGDrivE simulation outcomes. Risk 
estimates described here reflect the pupal development rates and dengue transmission 
thresholds described in Focks et al. (2000) for herd immunity levels of 0 and for temperatures of 
26°C (average temperature of Ponce is 26.2°C). The risk of dengue transmission at maximum 
mosquito population estimate prior to simulated deployment of gene drive mosquitoes for the 
entire study area was estimated to be a 60.6% probability of below transmission threshold, a 
7.69% probability at transmission threshold, and a 31.7% probability of being above the 
transmission threshold for the entire study region (Table 7). Overall risk of Zika transmission at 
maximum mosquito population estimate for all risk regions was estimated at 78.6% probability 
of being high risk (Table 8).  
Risk estimates for dengue transmission (Appendix 1) at maximum mosquito population estimate 
for RR1 and RR2 had the highest probability of being below transmission threshold based on 
pupae/person calculations (RR1 = 79.1%, RR2 = 59.5% probability of being below transmission 
threshold). RR3 was the only risk region that was at risk of dengue transmission at maximum 
mosquito population estimate; 43.3% probability of being below threshold, 7.69% probability of 
being at the threshold, and 49.1% probability of being above the dengue transmission threshold. 
When examining the outcomes of the release of gene drive Ae. aegypti to reduce dengue 
transmission without any other interventions, the risk distributions were identical for some 
scenarios. Resistance rates of 0.001 had a distribution similar to that of the maximum mosquito 
population estimate simulations (probability of being below transmission threshold: RR1 = 
79.1%, RR2 = 58.1%, RR3 = 40.0%). There was no change in probability distributions until the 
release scenario modeling a resistance generation rate of 0.0001, release ratio of 5:1, and 13  
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Table 7. Dengue transmission risk estimates for maximum simulation time scenarios. CC 
signifies maximum mosquito population estimate. At transmission threshold signifies that 
dengue transmission is possible based on pupae densities. Above transmission threshold 
















CC CC CC 60.63 7.69 31.70 
0.999 3340 13 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 10021 13 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 16702 13 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 3340 26 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 10021 26 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 16702 26 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 3340 39 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 10021 39 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.999 16702 39 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.9999 3340 13 59.07 7.69 33.23 
0.9999 10021 13 59.37 7.69 32.93 
0.9999 16702 13 60.37 7.69 31.97 
0.9999 3340 26 60.37 7.69 31.97 
0.9999 10021 26 63.90 7.69 28.40 
0.9999 16702 26 62.30 7.69 30.00 
0.9999 3340 39 60.03 7.69 32.27 
0.9999 10021 39 63.90 7.69 28.40 
0.9999 16702 39 67.13 7.69 25.17 
0.99995 3340 13 61.00 7.69 31.30 
0.99995 10021 13 63.27 7.69 29.03 
0.99995 16702 13 65.53 7.69 26.80 
0.99995 3340 26 63.90 7.69 28.40 
0.99995 10021 26 67.13 7.69 25.17 
0.99995 16702 26 65.53 7.69 26.80 
0.99995 3340 39 63.27 7.69 29.03 
0.99995 10021 39 66.17 7.69 26.13 
0.99995 16702 39 65.53 7.69 26.80 
0.99999 3340 13 68.43 7.69 23.87 
0.99999 10021 13 69.07 7.69 23.23 
0.99999 16702 13 70.37 7.69 21.93 
0.99999 3340 26 70.03 7.69 22.27 
0.99999 10021 26 71.67 7.69 20.63 
0.99999 16702 26 72.93 7.69 19.37 
0.99999 3340 39 72.63 7.69 19.67 
0.99999 10021 39 73.27 7.69 19.03 
0.99999 16702 39 74.23 7.69 18.07 
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Table 8. Zika transmission risk estimates for maximum simulation time MGDrivE release 
scenarios. CC signifies maximum mosquito population estimate simulations with no simulated 




















CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.60 
0.999 3340 13 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 10021 13 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 16702 13 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 3340 26 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 10021 26 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 16702 26 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 3340 39 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 10021 39 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.999 16702 39 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.9999 3340 13 12.40 11.96 17.00 58.67 
0.9999 10021 13 13.57 11.90 16.84 57.70 
0.9999 16702 13 17.17 11.76 16.34 54.73 
0.9999 3340 26 17.17 11.76 16.34 54.73 
0.9999 10021 26 30.30 11.30 14.47 43.93 
0.9999 16702 26 24.33 11.53 15.30 48.83 
0.9999 3340 39 15.97 11.83 16.50 55.70 
0.9999 10021 39 30.30 11.30 14.47 43.93 
0.9999 16702 39 42.27 10.90 12.77 34.10 
0.99995 3340 13 19.53 11.70 15.97 52.77 
0.99995 10021 13 27.93 11.40 14.80 45.90 
0.99995 16702 13 36.30 11.10 13.60 39.03 
0.99995 3340 26 30.30 11.30 14.47 43.93 
0.99995 10021 26 42.27 10.90 12.77 34.10 
0.99995 16702 26 36.30 11.10 13.60 39.03 
0.99995 3340 39 27.93 11.40 14.80 45.90 
0.99995 10021 39 38.63 11.03 13.27 37.03 
0.99995 16702 39 36.30 11.10 13.60 39.03 
0.99999 3340 13 47.03 10.73 12.07 30.17 
0.99999 10021 13 49.43 10.63 11.74 28.20 
0.99999 16702 13 54.20 10.46 11.07 24.23 
0.99999 3340 26 53.00 10.50 11.24 25.27 
0.99999 10021 26 59.00 10.30 10.40 20.33 
0.99999 16702 26 63.73 10.13 9.70 16.37 
0.99999 3340 39 62.57 10.16 9.87 17.40 
0.99999 10021 39 64.97 10.10 9.54 15.40 




weekly releases. All simulations with a 1:1 release ratio had similar probability distributions to 
the maximum mosquito population estimate levels. 
RR1 showed no change in probability distribution for all scenarios at the maximum simulation 
time; probability of being below dengue transmission threshold was constant at 79.1%. RR2 
varied from 58.1% at the lowest (0.001 resistance generation, 1:1 release ratio, 13 weekly 
releases) to 74.1% at its highest likelihood of being below transmission threshold (0.00001 
resistance generation rate, 5:1 release ratio, 39 weekly releases). RR3 varied in probability of 
being below dengue transmission threshold from 40.0% (0.001 resistance generation, 1:1 
release ratio, 13 weekly releases) to 69.5% (0.00001 resistance generation rate, 5:1 release 
ratio, 39 weekly releases).  
The risk calculations for Zika transmission in each region for the maximum simulation time 
(Appendix 2)  were constant for all simulations with release parameters of 0.001 resistance 
generation and for a resistance generation rate of 0.0001, release ratio of 1:1, and 13 weekly 
releases (High risk per region: RR1 = 39.6%, RR2 = 62.9%, RR3 = 73.5%). The remaining 
release parameters increased the likelihood of zero transmission as the resistance generation 
rate decreased or either the release ratio or duration of releases increased. The RR1 Zika 
transmission release ratio varied from 11.5% (0.001 resistance rate, 1:1 release ratio, & 13 
weekly releases) to 71.2% (0.00001 resistance generation rate, 5:1 release ratio, & 39 weekly 
releases). The zero transmission Zika risk calculations for RR2 varied from 15.6% (0.001 
resistance generation, 1:1 release ratio, 13 weekly releases) to 64.4% probability (0.00001 
resistance generation rate, 5:1 release ratio, & 39 weekly releases). The likelihood of zero 
transmission in RR3 increased from 10.1% to 70.0% (0.00001 resistance generation rate, 5:1 
release ratio, & 39 weekly releases) (Appendix 2). 
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4.3.2 Minimum simulation time 
All of the simulations examined for the timepoint when mosquito populations were at their lowest 
gave constant dengue transmission risk distributions for each region (Table 9, Appendix 3). All 
risk estimates used the transmission rates based off of 0% herd immunity and 26°C (Focks et 
al. 2000). The risk estimate for RR1 being below the dengue transmission threshold was 81.9%. 
Risk in RR2 was 80.0%. The RR3 risk estimate for being below the dengue transmission 
threshold was 76.4%. 
Analyzing risk of Zika transmission with the MGDrivE simulation output for the time period with 
the lowest average mosquito populations (Appendix 4) showed an increase in the probability of 
zero transmission as the resistance generation rate was decreased (Table 10). Resistance 
generation rates of 0.001, a release ratio of 1:1, and 13 weekly releases (the least invasive 
release scenario) resulted in zero Zika transmission risk of 25.6%, low risk of 20.6%, medium 
risk of 19.0%, and high risk of 34.8% in RR1.  Zika transmission risk estimates for RR2 showed 
zero transmission probability of 23.4%, low risk of 16.8%, medium risk of 42.3%, and 17.5% 
probability for high risk. Estimates for Zika transmission in RR3 ranged from 18.7% probability of 
zero transmission, 28.8% low transmission, 33.3% medium transmission, and 19.3% probability 
of high Zika transmission. Increasing the release ratio to 3:1 and weekly releases to 26 
increased the highest likelihood of zero transmission for this resistance generation level: zero 
Zika transmission probability of 59.8% for RR1 (low = 20.6%, med. = 8.7%, high = 10.8%), zero 
Zika transmission probability of 38.0% for RR2 (low = 33.8%, med. = 14.0%, high = 14.3%), and 
zero Zika transmission of 26.4% for RR3 (low = 44.7%, med. = 11.3%, high = 17.7%). 
The resistance generation rate of 0.0001 resulted in risk estimates for zero Zika transmission of 
38.7% for RR1 (low = 34.5%, med. = 10.9%, high = 15.8%), 25.7% for RR2 (low = 42.5%, med. 
= 17.5, high = 14.4%), and 20.8% for RR3 (low = 33.5%, med. = 28.0%, high = 17.7%) with the 
least invasive release scenario. Increasing the release ratio to 5:1 and weekly releases to 26  
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Table 9. Dengue transmission risk estimate for time point to minimum population size MGDrivE 
release scenarios for entire study area. CC signifies maximum mosquito population estimate 
















CC CC CC 60.63 7.69 31.70 
0.999 3340 13 79.43 7.69 12.90 
0.999 10021 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 16702 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 3340 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 10021 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 16702 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 3340 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 10021 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.999 16702 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 3340 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 10021 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 16702 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 3340 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 10021 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 16702 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 3340 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 10021 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.9999 16702 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 3340 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 10021 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 16702 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 3340 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 10021 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 16702 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 3340 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 10021 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99995 16702 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 3340 13 79.47 7.69 12.83 
0.99999 10021 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 16702 13 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 3340 26 79.47 7.69 12.83 
0.99999 10021 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 16702 26 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 3340 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 
0.99999 10021 39 79.50 7.69 12.80 




Table 10. Zika transmission risk estimates for time point to minimum population size MGDrivE 
release scenarios. CC signifies maximum mosquito population estimate simulations with no 
simulated gene drive releases. High transmission for release scenarios was stable at 14.27%, 




















CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.60 
0.999 3340 13 22.57 22.07 31.53 23.87 
0.999 10021 13 27.17 40.07 18.29 14.53 
0.999 16702 13 35.50 36.67 13.39 14.50 
0.999 3340 26 26.33 38.70 19.53 15.50 
0.999 10021 26 41.40 33.03 11.34 14.27 
0.999 16702 26 42.97 31.87 10.88 14.27 
0.999 3340 39 33.47 38.73 13.51 14.27 
0.999 10021 39 34.43 38.53 12.74 14.27 
0.999 16702 39 28.97 39.40 16.90 14.70 
0.9999 3340 13 28.40 36.83 18.80 15.97 
0.9999 10021 13 38.60 33.70 13.22 14.47 
0.9999 16702 13 40.80 32.23 12.04 14.27 
0.9999 3340 26 37.20 35.43 12.86 14.50 
0.9999 10021 26 46.07 28.73 10.94 14.27 
0.9999 16702 26 48.70 26.17 10.91 14.27 
0.9999 3340 39 41.93 32.73 11.04 14.27 
0.9999 10021 39 43.33 31.50 10.91 14.27 
0.9999 16702 39 42.10 32.30 11.34 14.27 
0.99995 3340 13 32.03 34.73 17.77 15.53 
0.99995 10021 13 40.87 32.30 12.36 14.50 
0.99995 16702 13 46.73 28.07 10.98 14.27 
0.99995 3340 26 40.10 32.47 12.77 14.67 
0.99995 10021 26 46.70 28.00 11.04 14.27 
0.99995 16702 26 50.07 24.80 10.88 14.27 
0.99995 3340 39 43.30 31.40 11.04 14.27 
0.99995 10021 39 43.90 30.93 10.88 14.27 
0.99995 16702 39 42.40 32.33 10.98 14.27 
0.99999 3340 13 40.80 30.27 13.59 15.37 
0.99999 10021 13 44.27 29.00 12.26 14.50 
0.99999 16702 13 48.47 25.60 11.64 14.27 
0.99999 3340 26 43.90 30.13 11.68 14.27 
0.99999 10021 26 53.23 21.47 11.08 14.27 
0.99999 16702 26 56.07 18.77 10.91 14.27 
0.99999 3340 39 55.03 19.67 11.08 14.27 
0.99999 10021 39 58.57 16.33 10.88 14.27 
0.99999 16702 39 58.93 15.93 10.88 14.27 
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gave the highest likelihood of zero transmission of 65.4% for RR1 (low = 15.1%, med. = 8.7%, 
high = 10.8%), 42.5% for RR2 (low = 29.5%, med. = 13.7%, high = 14.3%), and 38.2% for RR3 
(low = 33.9%, med. = 10.3%, high = 17.7%) (Appendix 4). 
Zero Zika transmission risk estimates varied from 45.1% for RR1 (low = 30.6%, med. = 10.2%, 
high = 14.2%), 28.9% for RR2 (low = 37.5%, med. = 18.9%, high = 14.7%), and 22.1% for RR3 
(low = 36.1%, med. = 24.2%, high = 17.7%) for the simulations modeling the resistance 
generation rate of 0.00005, 1:1 release ratio, and 13 weekly releases. The highest probabilities 
of zero transmission for this resistance rate were increased to 65.0% for RR1 (low = 15.5%, 
med. = 8.7%, high = 10.8%), 45.1% for RR2 (low = 26.9%, med. = 13.6%, high = 14.3%), and 
40.1% for RR3 (low = 32.0%, med. = 10.3%, high = 17.7%) with a release ratio of 5:1 and 26 
weekly releases (Appendix 4). 
The final resistance generation rate of 0.00001 gave risk estimates for zero Zika transmission of 
58.2% for RR1 (low = 19.0%, med. = 9.7%, high = 13.1%), 36.7% for RR2 (low = 32.88%, med. 
= 16.0%, high = 14.5%), and 27.5% for RR3 (low = 39.0%, med. = 15.1%, high = 18.5%) when 
modeled with a 1:1 release ratio and 13 weekly releases. These risk estimates were increased 
to 64.6% for RR1 (low = 15.9%, med. = 8.7%, high = 10.8%), 54.9% for RR2 (low = 17.2%, 
med. = 13.6%, high = 14.3%), and 57.3% for RR3 (low = 14.7%, med. = 10.3%, high = 17.7%) 
when the release ratio was increased to 5:1 with 39 weekly releases (Appendix 4). 
4.4 Uncertainties and sensitivity analysis 
Model sensitivity analysis shows the amount of influence that changes in one node can assert 
on the other nodes within the Bayesian network (Pollino et al. 2007; Marcot et al. 2012; Norsys 
2014). Model sensitivity is calculated as reduction in entropy or mutual information. Entropy 
means the amount of information that is held within a variable. Shared entropy between to 
variables is the amount of mutual information that can be gathered by observing only one of the 
49 
 
variables, showing their mutual dependence on one another. Sensitivity analysis determines to 
what degree each input influences the endpoint. Larger values of mutual information show a 
greater influence on an endpoint. 
Results of the sensitivity analysis in Netica™ focusing on entropy reduction showed that for the 
scenarios examined for the maximum simulation time the rate of accurate homology-directed 
repair (HDR) and conversely the rate of resistance generation was the most influential for Zika 
transmission, proportion of surviving mosquitoes that are resistant to the drive, and resulting 
population after the release of the gene drive. Sensitivity analysis showed that temperature was 
most influential on dengue transmission, followed by accurate HDR, release ratio, and duration 
of releases. For each node analyzed the overall pattern of importance was the same. Frequency 
of releases followed rate of resistance generation. The release ratio was the least important of 
the input nodes analyzed for each of the maximum simulation endpoints.  
Sensitivity analysis for the maximum simulation time Zika transmission node showed that the 
rate of HDR had an entropy reduction of 5.77%. The frequency of releases node had an entropy 
reduction of 0.295%, and the release ratio node had an entropy reduction of 0.217%. The 
dengue transmission node showed entropy reductions of 1.39% for temperature, 0.657% for 
HDR, 0.033% for release frequency, and 0.0243% for release ratio. The node representing the 
proportion of surviving mosquitoes that were resistant showed that HDR had a 4.84% entropy 
reduction, the frequency of releases 0.803%, and release ratio 0.376% reduction. When 
examining the intermediate node of resulting population after gene drive release I saw an 
entropy reduction of 14.7% for HDR, 0.0109% for release frequency, and 0.008% for release 
ratio (Figure 9). 
When running the sensitivity analysis on the Bayesian network that showed the results at the 
time point associated with the lowest possible population reduction, there was no consistent 




Figure 9. Results of entropy reduction analysis for maximum simulation time Bayesian network. 
population Zika transmission node showed an entropy reduction of 0.282% for rate of accurate 
HDR, 0.0744% for release ratio, and 0.0675% for duration of releases. Sensitivity analysis of 
the dengue transmission node showed an entropy reduction of 5.35% for temperature, 
0.000707% for accurate HDR, 0.000173% for release ratio, and 0.000151% for duration of 
releases.  
The node representing the rate of resistance within the surviving mosquito populations showed 
an entropy reduction of 16.9% for HDR, 1.52% for release frequency, and 0.012% for release 
ratio. The intermediate node showing the distribution of the resulting population number after 
the release of the gene drive showed entropy reductions of 10.4% for HDR, 2.09% for release 
ratio, and 2.04% for release frequency (Figure 10). Rates of accurate HDR was the most 
influential input node in relation to the endpoints and intermediate node examined with 
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sensitivity analysis, except for dengue transmission, where temperature was most influential. 
Release ratio was more influential that the frequency of releases for dengue and Zika 
transmission, as well as the resulting population size after the gene drive release. Frequency of 
releases was more influential that release ratio when examining the mutual information between 
input nodes and the node estimating the probability of the proportion of the surviving mosquito 
population developing resistance to the drive. 
 
Figure 10. Results of entropy reduction analysis for the Bayesian network showing time point 
associated with the greatest average population reduction. 
5. Discussion  
5.1 The risk assessment approach meets NASEM 2016 recommendations 
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommended the use of the 
BN-RRM for the risk assessment of gene drives within chapter six of their report, Gene Drives 
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on the Horizon (NASEM 2016). Several criteria were listed that future risk assessments must 
include to effectively model the risk associated with the development and deployment of gene 
drive technologies. These are: 1) acknowledging the fact that the field of synthetic biology is still 
in its infancy and uncertainties that lie behind every advancement need to be identified, 2) 
quantitatively and probabilistically describing the direct and indirect effects of the development 
and deployment of gene drive technologies, 3) discussing alternative management approaches 
in the risk assessment and quantifying the trade-offs between management scenarios, and 4) 
the model requires the input of all relevant stakeholders as well as management in order to 
effectively describe the cultural importance of endpoints within the specific study area.  
Criterion 1. Within the context of gene drive research, the amount of data regarding the 
propagation of gene drives within a target population is lacking. Lab releases have been few in 
number and relegated to a small subset of species. Research conducted to model the use of 
population suppression gene drives within my study are based off of work done on the malaria 
vector Anopheles gambiae (Hammond et al. 2016). There are most likely differences in how 
gene drives will propagate within different species of arbovirus vectors, as well as how fast the 
rates of resistance to the gene drive will occur. The Bayesian networks developed in this study 
incorporate uncertainties within the probability distributions of each node. Nodes that have 
lacking or insufficient data have been parameterized by even distributions to signify that there is 
insufficient data to determine calculations of risk. These even distributions signal that there are 
uncertainties that exist. If the findings of sensitivity analyses show that these areas are 
contributing to uncertainty these should be areas where future research is directed. Because the 
rate of accurate HDR and subsequently, the rates of resistance allele generation, proved to be 
very influential in the model results, extremely accurate estimations of potential drive systems 
would need to be calculated to inform future gene drive risk assessments. In terms of decision 
making, this means that management efforts need to prioritize research so that a complete 
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understanding of gene drive technologies can be developed. As suitable data are obtained, 
nodes can be further parameterized to better capture the full distributions of likely outcomes and 
other pathways can be included so that specific management goals can be addressed by the 
model. Any potential management actions taken before this is accomplished would be taken 
without regard for a true risk assessment, and any subsequent management actions would 
need to establish the fact that the knowledge available is likely to be incomplete. 
Criterion 2. The Bayesian networks I developed for the risk assessment of gene drive 
technologies highlight important research needs and areas of uncertainties that need to be 
addressed. To further inform the probability distributions of specific outcomes for each proposed 
release of engineered vector populations additional lab conducted releases of specific 
transgenic gene drive mosquitoes will be required. Field releases will greatly inform these 
uncertainties but should only be done once the impacts of field releases can be fully understood 
and their trade-offs quantified. Within the Bayesian networks I developed, additional pathways 
can be easily integrated that describe other endpoints and effects that stakeholders may deem 
necessary.  
These additional pathways may include the impacts to agricultural and ecological endpoints, as 
well as the likelihood of horizontal gene transfer of the drive or parts of the engineered genetic 
element into non-target species. Specific data that would inform these additional pathways 
describing unintended consequences depends on the potential endpoints being considered. 
Agricultural endpoints could be associated with the ecosystem services that the Ae. aegypti 
mosquito performs within Ponce. Studies examining their role as pollinators should extensively 
describe what specific functions the mosquito fulfils and in what circumstances. Ecological 
endpoints that could be impacted include food-web interactions. All species that eat the 
mosquito could be impacted by their eradication. The specific percentage of predator diet that 
the mosquito makes up should be defined. Any rates of recolonization by other mosquito 
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species would inform the impact on the food web. Although this was not accomplished in this 
study, my research has made it clear that a strong understanding of the role of the target 
species in the environment must be understood to grasp the full range of unintended outcomes. 
In the scenarios I modeled, incomplete eradication will most likely result in the replacement of 
the wild type population with one that has developed resistance to the gene drive. The existing 
management plan would then have to contend with a vector population that has already 
developed widespread resistance to contemporary pyrethroid pesticides (Agramonte et al. 
2017), as well as resistance to the particular gene drive deployed. 
Criterion 3. Discussing alternative management strategies and quantifying the ‘what-if’ 
scenarios (Pearl & Mackenzie 2018) make this approach ideal for use within an adaptive 
management framework (Landis et al. 2017). Any causal pathways that can be quantitatively 
described can be included into the Bayesian network. The Bayesian networks developed here 
can be further developed to include alternative management strategies by incorporating 
additional nodes that describe additional relevant causal pathways. Several pyrethroid 
insecticides were included for study within my Bayesian networks. The synergistic or 
antagonistic effects of other pesticides can be included given that there is sufficient toxicity data 
to develop dose-response curves to inform the conditional probability tables. Other pest 
management strategies can also be included, given that there are enough data about the 
management options, or through expert elicitation (Marcot et al. 2006). For example, an 
extensive effort to reduce standing water used as mosquito breeding habitat could be included 
within the nodes that model the maximum mosquito population estimate of each patch. If a 
dengue or Zika vaccine were to be developed and used, the infection rate within the human 
population could be modeled given the new probability of transmission rates. 
Criterion 4. The BN-RRM approach includes stakeholder input in an iterative manner that makes 
sure that one group does not dominate the input into the risk assessment. In this study direct 
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input from people within Puerto Rico and other stakeholder groups was not included. Attempts 
were made to reach out to the Puerto Rico Vector Control Unit and other arbovirus researchers 
in Puerto Rico. However, Puerto Rico is dealing with economic strife, disaster relief, and political 
uprisings (Bonilla 2020) that may have led to some having less time to respond to inquiries. The 
public and other stakeholders must be included when conducting a site-specific risk assessment 
for a tentative project looking at an actual release of gene drive engineered mosquitoes. By 
expanding the sphere of influence into the risk assessment process, those that will be directly 
impacted have access to determining the cultural values that will be included to determine the 
endpoints of the Bayesian network. This is especially helpful within the context of ecological risk 
assessment when defining what characteristics of the endpoints need to be measured and what 
terms like ‘recovered’ actually mean. 
5.2 Application to the field of synthetic biology 
The field of synthetic biology research is expanding and moving closer to field releases of 
transgenic organisms. To date there have been no quantitative risk assessments conducted for 
their use. By developing the Bayesian networks within this work, I have shown that the 
approach as recommended by the National Academies (NASEM 2016) can be fully integrated 
with highly site-specific spatial components to directly estimate the impacts of gene drive 
releases aimed at curtailing disease transmission. The BN-RRM can most likely be used to 
model synthetic biology release risk for any other purpose in any location, given sufficient data. 
The degree of specificity of future risk assessments will depend on the degree that data are 
available for the study area, the characteristics of the target species, and rates of propagation of 
the gene drive throughout the target population. However, even if the data sets are lacking, the 
Bayesian network approach highlights areas that require more information to be gathered and 
other areas that contribute to the uncertainties of gene drive deployment. In this sense, the 
Bayesian network approach can be a highly effective tool for management to help direct future 
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research into areas that will inform the overall risk assessment of the use of gene drive 
technologies.  
For any future risk assessment of gene drive and synthetic biology, specific information will be 
required to make any judgements about the intended and unintended outcomes due to their 
use. In the system that I modeled, incorporating population suppression gene drives as a 
management tool to reduce disease in Puerto Rico, the greatest data needs are related to the 
target species. Extensive trapping data would greatly inform the modeling by giving much more 
accurate estimates of existing Ae. aegypti populations. More information gained from lab 
releases of the drive in subsets of the vector population would greatly improve the knowledge of 
how the drive spreads through the target population, as well as estimates of the rates of 
resistance that will most likely develop as a result. The amount of time that the drive would 
remain effective could be established for gene drives that would result in a high likelihood of 
non-eradication. To even begin to model the unintended consequences of the release in Ponce, 
the life history parameters and rates of recolonization of closely related vector and non-vector 
species would need to be understood. Rates of hybridization between the Ae. aegypti and any 
other potential mates would have to be established to determine the probability of gene transfer 
between target and non-target species. A substantial survey of the role that the Ae. aegypti 
servers within the ecosystem and any ecosystem services that the mosquito supplies could 
influence any estimates regarding the risk associated with the complete eradication of the 
species and the impacts that would have on local food-webs.  
5.3 Gene drive risk assessment within adaptive management 
Adaptive management is an iterative process where resource managers update their strategies 
as concurrent strategies provide additional insights to their efficacy (Landis et al. 2017). 
Adaptive management uses knowledge gained through current monitoring programs to 
constantly update and improve available options for resource managers. The adaptive 
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management process can be thought of as a loop. The process is driven by public engagement 
and governance. Existing problems are defined that reflect the culturally significant endpoints of 
the study area, goals are explicitly stated, management actions are explored, and data that are 
relevant to determining risk to the endpoints through the monitoring programs are examined. At 
this point the impacts of current management practices are re-evaluated with updated 
information and the process starts over with the goal of constantly improving the outcomes 
(Landis et al. 2017). Adaptive management will be a substantial regulatory tool to constantly 
evaluate the interactions of a gene drive with the environment. Gene drives have not been 
leveraged as a management option before and any information that is gathered that 
quantitatively describes the outcomes can be used to make better judgements about 
subsequent management actions.  
The BN-RRM has been shown to appropriately integrate within the adaptive management 
framework (Landis et al. 2017). Any management option that includes the deployment of gene 
drives will require the input of stakeholders and local governance. Existing and alternative 
management strategies must be examined to determine if the use of gene drives is warranted, 
given the vast uncertainties involved with their use, including rates of horizontal gene transfer 
and the lack of a reversibility once the gene drive has been deployed. 
Gene drives and synthetic biology present a true ‘wicked pro lem’ (Rittel and e  er     ). 
Almost all of the criteria listed by Rittel and Webber (1973) can be associated with use of a gene 
drive. In almost any sense, the dilemmas posed by the use of a gene drive are planning 
problems; a gene drive would only be used to solve some sort of greater issue, in my case 
study the issue would be the reduction in debilitating mosquito borne disease. Because of the 
uncertainties involved with gene drive use, the full breadth of consequential outcomes is almost 
inconceivable to define (Rittel and Webber 1973). The unknown consequences of the 
deployment of a gene drive are so great because the research is still in its infancy and because 
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the world in which a gene drive would be introduced is inherently an open system with no way to 
completely model every interaction that could possibly take place. The best we can do is model 
potential outcomes, but this is in itself another wicked problem. The range of stakeholders that 
are involved with potential uses of gene drives also lends itself to the issue. Each distinct group 
of people that can be affected by a gene drive will have differing socio-economic backgrounds 
with differing attitudes about the appropriateness of a solution that gene drives could potentially 
solve (Rittel and Webber 1973). Furthermore, the impacts of a gene drive may prove to be 
completely irreversible, and any potential solutions to reverse a drive will present yet another 
wicked problem. The starkest characteristic of gene drives as a wicked problem is that each and 
every potential use will present its own set of unique circumstances with no clear resolutions. 
The characteristics of a target species will differ between location, the aspects of a certain gene 
drive architecture will be different depending on the genetic makeup of the target species, and 
the social values of the stakeholders won’t  e consistent even within one proposed use and will 
vary over time. Because every proposed usage of a gene drive will be unique, the lessons from 
one circumstance may very well lend themselves to another proposed use but no two will be 
identical and commonalities should not be necessarily assumed (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
The synthetic biology risk assessment framework recommended by the National Academies 
(NASEM 2016) and explored within this study shows that risk can be calculated for various 
management options related to the release of gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti as vectors to 
control dengue and Zika virus. This framework can easily be adapted to alternate locations and 
the inclusion of alternative management strategies can be incorporated given that the data sets 
are sufficient. Although no two gene drive proposals will be identical, certain similarities between 
them can be characterized so that the potential outcomes can be estimated. The BN-RRM can 
be adapted to specific landscapes if the geospatial data are available at that site. The 
advancements and characteristics of gene drive architectures can be incorporated into the 
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modeling process so that the ability of the drive to spread within the target population can be 
reasonably understood and parameterized. 
In the scenario I explored, the BN-RRM can provide disease prevention specialists with a 
powerful tool to evaluate proposed and current management practices with regard to the 
potential release of gene drives. If an adaptive management process were undertaken, the BN-
RRM can be easily updated with any additional information as it becomes available. The risk 
estimates would reflect the most current information available and the trade-offs incurred by 
their use, or other management strategies, can be easily visualized. 
Within this study the integration of alternative management strategies was shown through the 
inclusion of a pesticide application pathway. This causal pathway illustrates how current 
management approaches can be used together with gene drive technologies to drive mosquito 
populations to levels below disease transmission thresholds. Additionally, this shows how 
incomplete eradication of the target species can still be a useful outcome to managers that have 
alternative and additional strategies in place to control the remaining mosquito populations. If 
avoiding resistance to the gene drive is an ideal endpoint, the Bayesian network can calculate 
what release scenarios could be used to avoid the likely development of resistance. If these 
scenarios resulted in non-eradication events, they could still be a beneficial outcome within an 
overarching adaptive management scheme that includes current mosquito control measures. 
Pesticide application schemes can then be modeled using site-specific information to determine 
the likelihood of further reducing populations based on dose-response modeling parameterized 
into the pesticide application pathway of the Bayesian network. 
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6. Conclusions and Next Steps 
6.1 Resistance generation 
Lab tested gene drives, such as those demonstrated by Hammond et al. (2016), lack a 
sufficiently low resistance generation rate for them to be effective as a stand-alone tool for 
complete eradication of mosquito species when modeled over large spatial scales. Landscape 
scale releases, as demonstrated by the results of this study, will only result in rebounds of 
resistant or wild-type mosquitoes. For complete eradication as a result of the gene drive, the 
resistance generation rate of the target population must be below some critical level as 
determined by the size of the starting population of mosquitoes (Champer et al. 2017; Marshall 
et al. 2017; Noble et al. 2017; Unckless et al. 2017). If all habitat patches within the release area 
are connected, there will be a high likelihood that resistance developing in one patch, due to the 
high selective pressure against the fitness reduction of the drive, will spread to the remaining 
patches.  As demonstrated by this study, successful population suppression will be dependent 
upon the number of gene drive engineered mosquitoes released, the duration of releases, and 
the characteristics of the landscape, the population dynamics of the target species, and more 
importantly, the resistance allele generation rate. 
Resistance generation due to non-homologous end-joining must be circumvented for gene drive 
technologies to be viable for population suppression. As gene drive and synthetic biology 
technology progresses, techniques such as multiplexing (Marshall et al. 2017) could sufficiently 
reduce the rate of resistance generation to the gene drive within the target species to rates that 
could lead to complete population suppression. Currently, the rates of resistance generation to 
demonstrated gene drives are insufficient. What my modeling has shown is that the gene drive 
releases of any scenario do reduce the target population up to a point. Depending on the 
parameters surrounding the releases of the gene drive engineered organisms there are varying 
degrees of success in terms of reducing overall population numbers.  
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Currently available gene drives may not be suitable for complete eradication of certain target 
populations of mosquitoes. However, they can be seen as a management option for effectively 
reducing populations to levels below thresholds required for disease transmission. Results of 
my modeling show that gene drives may be suitable as one tool within an adaptive management 
framework that can leverage other existing management options to potentially eradicate    a 
population of Ae. aegypti. However, the implications of complete eradication of the Ae. aegypti 
from one area are not well understood. Current research into the ecosystem services provided 
by the Ae. aegypti are not well documented. The complete impacts of elimination from a specific 
community can be described with direct monitoring after a release of the engineered 
mosquitoes. By incorporating alternative management strategies within the BN-RRM, the trade-
offs of various management strategies can be easily quantified. If the goal is to effectively 
reduce vector populations to some predetermined level and then aggressively leverage 
contemporary mosquito management strategies to further reduce the populations, the desired 
outcome may be achievable. The estimation of risk for the direct and indirect effects can be 
obtainable through the risk assessment framework recommended by the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM 2016). To incorporate the pathways to describe 
the indirect effects associated with gene drive engineered Ae. aegypti and a method of disease 
control, much more data regarding the ecosystem services that the mosquito provides in Ponce 
needs to be gathered. To inform food-web interactions that could be impacted, the role of the 
mosquito in the diet of local predators needs to be quantified. Rates of hybridization with non-
target species and gene transfer are unknown for the non-vector mosquito species and would 
have to be determined to inform the risk of horizontal gene transfer. The agricultural impacts 
resulting from eradication of the mosquito in Ponce are currently unquantified and would need to 
be researched in order to develop risk estimates for this endpoint. Undoubtedly there will be 
unintended consequences and future risk assessments can incorporate these pathways into the 
modeling framework to highlight research needs that would inform management decisions. 
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The BN-RRM has shown its utility as part of an epidemiological risk assessment framework. 
Causal disease pathways, where a mechanistic understanding of how disease transmission 
occurs (Chen and Pollino 2007; Marcot 2017; Landis et al. 2020), were included to quantitatively 
describe the risk of transmission rates for diseases vectored by the Ae. aegypti mosquito within 
Ponce, Puerto Rico. Although the gene drive modeled after the construct created by Hammond 
et al. (2016) was unsuccessful in causing eradication in simulations, it was successful in 
causing drastic declines in simulated mosquito populations. Resource managers could use the 
BN-RRM to explore decisions based on the trade-offs between overall population reduction and 
the likelihood of resistance to the gene drive developing in the remaining population. Multiple 
synergistic management options can also be included to determine what the best possible 
outcome or set of outcomes would be depending on the scenarios depicted. 
This work builds off of the approach recommended by the National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM 2016), and goes a step further by incorporating site specific 
details into a case-study related to the use of gene drives as vectors to control disease. The 
Bayesian networks provide estimations of risk for the direct and indirect effects of gene drive 
deployment in a way that can be highly useful to the decision-making process. The work that I 
have done highlights some of the data requirements for future quantitative risk assessments of 
gene drive technologies. These data requirements inform the site-specific release scenarios that 
are able to be integrated into the BN-RRM approach. Furthermore, this approach illustrates the 
flexibility of the BN-RRM to any potential future release of gene drives by being able to 
incorporate site-specific and organismal specific characteristics into the model that can easily be 
adapted for different research programs. 
The trade-offs of alternative management actions are represented in a meaningful way that fits 
well within an adaptive management decision making framework (Landis et al. 2017). The BN-
RRM shows how specific decisions can be evaluated regarding gene drive deployment. The 
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framework also shows how information relating to gene drive technology can be assembled in a 
way that directly supports the decision-making process. The BN-RRM lets researchers and 
decision makers understand the trade-offs associated with management actions and improves 
the overall effectiveness and utility of the novel technology posed by gene drive and synthetic 
biology products. 
6.2 Next steps 
1) In order to further develop the estimation of risk associated with the use of gene drives, the 
full range of possible outcomes needs to be examined. In my study ecological and agricultural 
pathways have not been included due to lack of research into those areas. These could be 
included and left unparameterized with even distributions to signify knowledge gaps. The 
complete range of risk needs to be known to fully comprehend what the trade-offs associated 
with the use of gene drives are. The BN-RRM can be used as the risk assessment tool for 
synthetic biology moving forward that will clearly highlight areas of uncertainty. This study 
shows that the aspects of the spread of the gene drive through a population can be absorbed 
into the BN-RRM framework with additional stressors (pesticides) modeled. The landscape 
characteristics that will affect the spread of the gene drive will differ from location to location and 
as the system that is being modeled becomes larger. If geospatial data exists for locations of 
gene drive use, then these landscape conditions can be interpreted as inputs into the BN-RRM. 
The role of temperature on the vector density of Ae. aegypti and rates of Zika transmission is an 
area that needs to be addressed. Although Zika transmission thresholds were developed by 
Barrera et al. (2017), these were in relation to trapping data and rates of seroprevalence of 
disease and the influence of temperature was not accounted for. Sensitivity analysis showed 
that temperature is highly influential (Figures 9 and 10) in the dengue transmission pathway 
(Focks et al. 2000) and most likely has a similar role in Zika transmission (Barrera et al. 2017). 
Areas of uncertainty represent research gaps that are required to comprehend the full range of 
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risk. It is suggested that gene drive research be monitored using an adaptive management 
approach (NASEM 2016). The BN-RRM can be used to constantly update risk calculations 
based on any new data that becomes available. 
2) The role of Ae. aegypti within Puerto Rico would need to be better understood to fully 
understand the ecological impacts of their eradication. There are 36 known species of mosquito 
that inhabit parts of Puerto Rico (Fox 1953). The principal vector for dengue and Zika virus is 
the Ae. aegypti mosquito. The Aedes spp. do act as pollinators for some orchid species (Thein 
1969; Gorham 1976; Lahondère et al. 2020), but these plant species do not occur within Puerto 
Rico and are more commonly found in Northern latitudes. Eradication of the Ae. aegypti may 
pose little threat to pollination success of plant species within Puerto Rico, though there is a lack 
of research into this area, which must be addressed if field deployments of gene drive 
engineered mosquitoes were to be proposed as a management strategy. A full understanding of 
the ecosystem services that the Ae. aegypti performs is a necessary requirement for 
determining risk of gene drive use and the unintended consequences as they relate to the 
ecological interactions in the study area. Furthermore, within this study Ponce was treated as a 
closed system and emigration and dispersal of the gene drive was not considered to other 
bordering municipalities. To have a complete range of risk calculation the likelihood of the gene 
drive spreading beyond political borders within well connected habitat needs to be addressed. 
Dispersal beyond legal boundaries can be incorporated by expanding the spatial scope to the 
rest of Puerto Rico, given that sufficient spatial data exists to do that, if not than this highlights 
yet another area to be researched in terms of having a complete understanding of risk. 
3) Predation upon Ae. aegypti within Puerto Rico is not a significant controlling factor on 
regulating their populations (Barrera et al. 2006). Although there are several species that have 
been documented as taking Ae. aegypti as food items, none of these predators specialize on 
eating the Ae. aegypti mosquito solely (Arrivillaga & Barrera 2003). Introduction of biocontrol 
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agents into specific Ae. aegypti habitats can reduce populations, but because the mosquito can 
use highly cryptic containers as habitats, the predator species are not likely to be present in 
many areas (Krol et al. 2019). Understanding the role of Ae. aegypti as a food source would be 
required to parameterize nodes and pathways that describe ecological impacts of their 
eradication. Other mosquito species could expand their range and fill the role of food items for 
predators, but this another area where research must be conducted if field deployments were to 
be proposed. If the Ae. aegypti were to be fully eradicated from a location, the rates of 
recolonization of other mosquito species in the area would need to be quantified in order to 
better describe the agricultural and ecological impacts resulting from their extirpation, especially 
if a closely related species is also a disease vector. 
4) The BN-RRM can be adapted to include both ecological and human health endpoints. The 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s recommended approach to the 
regulation and risk assessment of gene drives (NASEM 2016) is achievable using realistic 
landscape characteristics and parameters that describe how the gene drive spreads throughout 
and reduces the target population, impacting human health endpoints. As the research into 
gene drives progresses, new data can be incorporated into the risk assessment process in an 
iterative fashion that can be constantly updated to suit manager’s needs.  hrough this 
recommended approach (NASEM 2016), the effects resulting from the use of gene drives as 
methods to control disease can be quantified in a probabilistic manner. However, there are large 
data gaps regarding the role that the Ae. aegypti mosquito servers within the ecosystem and 
these areas need to be addressed in a probabilistic way before a complete risk assessment of 
gene drive engineered mosquitoes can be fully completed. 
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1 CC CC CC 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 CC CC CC 59.5 7.69 32.8 
3 CC CC CC 43.3 7.69 49.1 
1 0.999 3340 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 3340 13 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 3340 13 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 10021 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 10021 13 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 10021 13 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 16702 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 16702 13 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 16702 13 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 3340 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 3340 26 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 3340 26 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 10021 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 10021 26 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 10021 26 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 16702 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 16702 26 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 16702 26 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 3340 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 3340 39 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 3340 39 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 10021 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 10021 39 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 10021 39 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.999 16702 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.999 16702 39 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.999 16702 39 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.9999 3340 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 3340 13 58.1 7.69 34.2 
3 0.9999 3340 13 40 7.69 52.3 
1 0.9999 10021 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 10021 13 58.4 7.69 33.9 
3 0.9999 10021 13 40.6 7.69 51.7 
1 0.9999 16702 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 16702 13 59.5 7.69 32.9 




















1 0.9999 3340 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 3340 26 59.5 7.69 32.9 
3 0.9999 3340 26 42.5 7.69 49.8 
1 0.9999 10021 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 10021 26 63.2 7.69 29.1 
3 0.9999 10021 26 49.4 7.69 42.9 
1 0.9999 16702 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 16702 26 61.5 7.69 30.8 
3 0.9999 16702 26 46.3 7.69 46 
1 0.9999 3340 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 3340 39 59.1 7.69 33.2 
3 0.9999 3340 39 41.9 7.69 50.4 
1 0.9999 10021 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 10021 39 63.2 7.69 29.1 
3 0.9999 10021 39 49.4 7.69 42.9 
1 0.9999 16702 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.9999 16702 39 66.6 7.69 25.7 
3 0.9999 16702 39 55.7 7.69 36.6 
1 0.99995 3340 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 3340 13 60.1 7.69 32.2 
3 0.99995 3340 13 43.8 7.69 48.5 
1 0.99995 10021 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 10021 13 62.5 7.69 29.8 
3 0.99995 10021 13 48.2 7.69 44.1 
1 0.99995 16702 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 16702 13 64.9 7.69 27.4 
3 0.99995 16702 13 52.6 7.69 39.8 
1 0.99995 3340 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 3340 26 63.2 7.69 29.1 
3 0.99995 3340 26 49.4 7.69 42.9 
1 0.99995 10021 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 10021 26 66.6 7.69 25.7 
3 0.99995 10021 26 55.7 7.69 36.6 
1 0.99995 16702 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 16702 26 64.9 7.69 27.4 
3 0.99995 16702 26 52.6 7.69 39.8 
1 0.99995 3340 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 3340 39 62.5 7.69 29.8 
3 0.99995 3340 39 48.2 7.69 44.1 
       




















1 0.99995 10021 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 10021 39 65.6 7.69 26.7 
3 0.99995 10021 39 53.8 7.69 38.5 
1 0.99995 16702 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99995 16702 39 64.9 7.69 27.4 
3 0.99995 16702 39 52.6 7.69 39.8 
1 0.99999 3340 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 3340 13 68 7.69 24.3 
3 0.99999 3340 13 58.2 7.69 34.1 
1 0.99999 10021 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 10021 13 68.6 7.69 23.7 
3 0.99999 10021 13 59.5 7.69 32.8 
1 0.99999 16702 13 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 16702 13 70 7.69 22.3 
3 0.99999 16702 13 62 7.69 30.3 
1 0.99999 3340 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 3340 26 69.7 7.69 22.6 
3 0.99999 3340 26 61.3 7.69 31 
1 0.99999 10021 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 10021 26 71.4 7.69 20.9 
3 0.99999 10021 26 64.5 7.69 27.8 
1 0.99999 16702 26 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 16702 26 72.7 7.69 19.6 
3 0.99999 16702 26 67 7.69 25.3 
1 0.99999 3340 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 3340 39 72.4 7.69 19.9 
3 0.99999 3340 39 66.4 7.69 25.9 
1 0.99999 10021 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 10021 39 73.1 7.69 19.2 
3 0.99999 10021 39 67.6 7.69 24.7 
1 0.99999 16702 39 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 0.99999 16702 39 74.1 7.69 18.2 




























1 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
2 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
3 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
1 0.999 3340 13 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 3340 13 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 3340 13 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 10021 13 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 10021 13 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 10021 13 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 16702 13 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 16702 13 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 16702 13 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 3340 26 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 3340 26 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 3340 26 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 10021 26 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 10021 26 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 10021 26 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 16702 26 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 16702 26 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 16702 26 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 3340 39 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 3340 39 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 3340 39 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 10021 39 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 10021 39 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 10021 39 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.999 16702 39 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.999 16702 39 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.999 16702 39 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.9999 3340 13 11.5 15.9 33.1 39.6 
2 0.9999 3340 13 15.6 11.7 9.75 62.9 
3 0.9999 3340 13 10.1 8.29 8.16 73.5 
1 0.9999 10021 13 12.7 15.7 32.6 39 
2 0.9999 10021 13 16.6 11.7 9.75 61.9 
3 0.9999 10021 13 11.4 8.29 8.16 72.2 
1 0.9999 16702 13 16.5 15.3 31.1 37 
2 0.9999 16702 13 19.8 11.7 9.75 58.8 
3 0.9999 16702 13 15.2 8.29 8.16 68.4 
























1 0.9999 3340 26 16.5 15.3 31.1 37 
2 0.9999 3340 26 19.8 11.7 9.75 58.8 
3 0.9999 3340 26 15.2 8.29 8.16 68.4 
1 0.9999 10021 26 30.5 13.9 25.5 30.1 
2 0.9999 10021 26 31.2 11.7 9.75 47.4 
3 0.9999 10021 26 29.2 8.29 8.16 54.3 
1 0.9999 16702 26 24.2 14.6 28 33.2 
2 0.9999 16702 26 26 11.7 9.75 52.6 
3 0.9999 16702 26 22.8 8.29 8.16 60.7 
1 0.9999 3340 39 15.3 15.5 31.6 37.7 
2 0.9999 3340 39 18.7 11.7 9.75 59.8 
3 0.9999 3340 39 13.9 8.29 8.16 69.6 
1 0.9999 10021 39 30.5 13.9 25.5 30.1 
2 0.9999 10021 39 31.2 11.7 9.75 47.4 
3 0.9999 10021 39 29.2 8.29 8.16 54.3 
1 0.9999 16702 39 43.2 12.7 20.4 23.7 
2 0.9999 16702 39 41.6 11.7 9.75 37 
3 0.9999 16702 39 42 8.29 8.16 41.6 
1 0.99995 3340 13 19.1 15.1 30 35.8 
2 0.99995 3340 13 21.8 11.7 9.75 56.7 
3 0.99995 3340 13 17.7 8.29 8.16 65.8 
1 0.99995 10021 13 28 14.2 26.5 31.3 
2 0.99995 10021 13 29.1 11.7 9.75 49.5 
3 0.99995 10021 13 26.7 8.29 8.16 56.9 
1 0.99995 16702 13 36.9 13.3 22.9 26.9 
2 0.99995 16702 13 36.4 11.7 9.75 42.2 
3 0.99995 16702 13 35.6 8.29 8.16 48 
1 0.99995 3340 26 30.5 13.9 25.5 30.1 
2 0.99995 3340 26 31.2 11.7 9.75 47.4 
3 0.99995 3340 26 29.2 8.29 8.16 54.3 
1 0.99995 10021 26 43.2 12.7 20.4 23.7 
2 0.99995 10021 26 41.6 11.7 9.75 37 
3 0.99995 10021 26 42 8.29 8.16 41.6 
1 0.99995 16702 26 36.9 13.3 22.9 26.9 
2 0.99995 16702 26 36.4 11.7 9.75 42.2 
3 0.99995 16702 26 35.6 8.29 8.16 48 
1 0.99995 3340 39 28 14.2 26.5 31.3 
2 0.99995 3340 39 29.1 11.7 9.75 49.5 
3 0.99995 3340 39 26.7 8.29 8.16 56.9 
        
        
























1 0.99995 10021 39 39.4 13.1 21.9 25.6 
2 0.99995 10021 39 38.4 11.7 9.75 40.1 
3 0.99995 10021 39 38.1 8.29 8.16 45.4 
1 0.99995 16702 39 36.9 13.3 22.9 26.9 
2 0.99995 16702 39 36.4 11.7 9.75 42.2 
3 0.99995 16702 39 35.6 8.29 8.16 48 
1 0.99999 3340 13 48.3 12.2 18.3 21.2 
2 0.99999 3340 13 45.7 11.7 9.75 32.8 
3 0.99999 3340 13 47.1 8.29 8.16 36.5 
1 0.99999 10021 13 50.9 11.9 17.3 19.9 
2 0.99999 10021 13 47.8 11.7 9.75 30.8 
3 0.99999 10021 13 49.6 8.29 8.16 33.9 
1 0.99999 16702 13 56 11.4 15.3 17.3 
2 0.99999 16702 13 51.9 11.7 9.75 26.6 
3 0.99999 16702 13 54.7 8.29 8.16 28.8 
1 0.99999 3340 26 54.7 11.5 15.8 18 
2 0.99999 3340 26 50.9 11.7 9.75 27.7 
3 0.99999 3340 26 53.4 8.29 8.16 30.1 
1 0.99999 10021 26 61.1 10.9 13.3 14.8 
2 0.99999 10021 26 56.1 11.7 9.75 22.5 
3 0.99999 10021 26 59.8 8.29 8.16 23.7 
1 0.99999 16702 26 66.1 10.4 11.2 12.2 
2 0.99999 16702 26 60.2 11.7 9.75 18.3 
3 0.99999 16702 26 64.9 8.29 8.16 18.6 
1 0.99999 3340 39 64.9 10.5 11.7 12.9 
2 0.99999 3340 39 59.2 11.7 9.75 19.4 
3 0.99999 3340 39 63.6 8.29 8.16 19.9 
1 0.99999 10021 39 67.4 10.3 10.7 11.6 
2 0.99999 10021 39 61.3 11.7 9.75 17.3 
3 0.99999 10021 39 66.2 8.29 8.16 17.3 
1 0.99999 16702 39 71.2 9.88 9.19 9.7 
2 0.99999 16702 39 64.4 11.7 9.75 14.2 
























1 CC CC CC 79.1 7.69 13.2 
2 CC CC CC 59.5 7.69 32.8 
3 CC CC CC 43.3 7.69 49.1 
1 0.999 3340 13 81.9 7.69 10.5 
2 0.999 3340 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 3340 13 76.4 7.69 15.9 
1 0.999 10021 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 10021 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 10021 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 16702 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 16702 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 16702 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 3340 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 3340 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 3340 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 10021 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 10021 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 10021 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 16702 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 16702 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 16702 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 3340 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 3340 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 3340 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 10021 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 10021 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 10021 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.999 16702 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.999 16702 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.999 16702 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 3340 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 3340 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 3340 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 10021 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 10021 13 80 7.69 12.3 






















1 0.9999 16702 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 16702 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 16702 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 3340 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 3340 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 3340 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 10021 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 10021 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 10021 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 16702 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 16702 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 16702 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 3340 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 3340 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 3340 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 10021 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 10021 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 10021 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.9999 16702 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.9999 16702 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.9999 16702 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 3340 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 3340 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 3340 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 10021 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 10021 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 10021 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 16702 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 16702 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 16702 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 3340 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 3340 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 3340 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 10021 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 10021 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 10021 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 16702 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 16702 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 16702 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
       





















1 0.99995 3340 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 3340 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 3340 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 10021 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 10021 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 10021 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99995 16702 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99995 16702 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99995 16702 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 3340 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 3340 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 3340 13 76.5 7.69 15.8 
1 0.99999 10021 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 10021 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 10021 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 16702 13 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 16702 13 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 16702 13 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 3340 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 3340 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 3340 26 76.5 7.69 15.8 
1 0.99999 10021 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 10021 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 10021 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 16702 26 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 16702 26 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 16702 26 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 3340 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 3340 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 3340 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 10021 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 10021 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 10021 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 
1 0.99999 16702 39 81.9 7.69 10.4 
2 0.99999 16702 39 80 7.69 12.3 
3 0.99999 16702 39 76.6 7.69 15.7 



























1 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
2 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
3 CC CC CC 7.14 7.14 7.14 78.6 
1 0.999 3340 13 25.6 20.6 19 34.8 
2 0.999 3340 13 23.4 16.8 42.3 17.5 
3 0.999 3340 13 18.7 28.8 33.3 19.3 
1 0.999 10021 13 36.8 42.9 8.97 11.4 
2 0.999 10021 13 23.7 43.4 18.4 14.5 
3 0.999 10021 13 21 33.9 27.5 17.7 
1 0.999 16702 13 49.1 30.6 8.97 11.4 
2 0.999 16702 13 32.5 37.6 15.6 14.4 
3 0.999 16702 13 24.9 41.8 15.6 17.7 
1 0.999 3340 26 34.8 40.9 10.2 14.2 
2 0.999 3340 26 23.7 42.3 19.4 14.6 
3 0.999 3340 26 20.5 32.9 29 17.7 
1 0.999 10021 26 59.8 20.6 8.73 10.8 
2 0.999 10021 26 38 33.8 14 14.3 
3 0.999 10021 26 26.4 44.7 11.3 17.7 
1 0.999 16702 26 62.6 17.8 8.73 10.8 
2 0.999 16702 26 39.6 32.5 13.6 14.3 
3 0.999 16702 26 26.7 45.3 10.3 17.7 
1 0.999 3340 39 46.7 33.7 8.73 10.8 
2 0.999 3340 39 28.9 41 15.8 14.3 
3 0.999 3340 39 24.8 41.5 16 17.7 
1 0.999 10021 39 47.1 33.3 8.73 10.8 
2 0.999 10021 39 30.8 39.5 15.4 14.3 
3 0.999 10021 39 25.4 42.8 14.1 17.7 
1 0.999 16702 39 40.7 38.1 9.2 12 
2 0.999 16702 39 24 43.7 17.8 14.4 
3 0.999 16702 39 22.2 36.4 23.7 17.7 
        
























1 0.9999 3340 13 38.7 34.5 10.9 15.8 
2 0.9999 3340 13 25.7 42.5 17.5 14.4 
3 0.9999 3340 13 20.8 33.5 28 17.7 
1 0.9999 10021 13 56.6 23 8.97 11.4 
2 0.9999 10021 13 34.4 36.6 14.7 14.3 
3 0.9999 10021 13 24.8 41.5 16 17.7 
1 0.9999 16702 13 61 19.4 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 16702 13 37 34.5 14.2 14.3 
3 0.9999 16702 13 24.4 42.8 13.2 17.7 
1 0.9999 3340 26 53.4 26.2 8.97 11.4 
2 0.9999 3340 26 32.8 37.3 15.5 14.4 
3 0.9999 3340 26 25.4 42.8 14.1 17.7 
1 0.9999 10021 26 64.2 16.3 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 10021 26 41.6 30.3 13.8 14.3 
3 0.9999 10021 26 32.4 39.6 10.3 17.7 
1 0.9999 16702 26 65.4 15.1 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 16702 26 42.5 29.5 13.7 14.3 
3 0.9999 16702 26 38.2 33.9 10.3 17.7 
1 0.9999 3340 39 61.8 18.6 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 3340 39 37.3 34.3 14.1 14.3 
3 0.9999 3340 39 26.7 45.3 10.3 17.7 
1 0.9999 10021 39 63.4 17.1 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 10021 39 39.9 32.1 13.7 14.3 
3 0.9999 10021 39 26.7 45.3 10.3 17.7 
1 0.9999 16702 39 62.2 18.2 8.73 10.8 
2 0.9999 16702 39 37.7 34 14 14.3 
3 0.9999 16702 39 26.4 44.7 11.3 17.7 
1 0.99995 3340 13 45.1 30.6 10.2 14.2 
2 0.99995 3340 13 28.9 37.5 18.9 14.7 
3 0.99995 3340 13 22.1 36.1 24.2 17.7 
1 0.99995 10021 13 58.6 21 8.97 11.4 
2 0.99995 10021 13 36.4 34.4 14.9 14.4 
3 0.99995 10021 13 27.6 41.5 13.2 17.7 
        
























1 0.99995 16702 13 61 19.4 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 16702 13 42.9 29 13.9 14.3 
3 0.99995 16702 13 36.3 35.8 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99995 3340 26 57.8 21 9.2 12 
2 0.99995 3340 26 36 35.2 14.5 14.3 
3 0.99995 3340 26 26.5 41.2 14.6 17.7 
1 0.99995 10021 26 63.4 17.1 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 10021 26 43.2 28.9 13.6 14.3 
3 0.99995 10021 26 33.5 38 10.8 17.7 
1 0.99995 16702 26 65 15.5 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 16702 26 45.1 26.9 13.6 14.3 
3 0.99995 16702 26 40.1 32 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99995 3340 39 61.4 19 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 3340 39 38.6 33 14.1 14.3 
3 0.99995 3340 39 29.9 42.2 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99995 10021 39 63.8 16.7 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 10021 39 41.2 30.8 13.6 14.3 
3 0.99995 10021 39 26.7 45.3 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99995 16702 39 62.2 18.2 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99995 16702 39 38.3 33.5 13.9 14.3 
3 0.99995 16702 39 26.7 45.3 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99999 3340 13 58.2 19 9.68 13.1 
2 0.99999 3340 13 36.7 32.8 16 14.5 
3 0.99999 3340 13 27.5 39 15.1 18.5 
1 0.99999 10021 13 61.4 18.2 8.97 11.4 
2 0.99999 10021 13 39.9 31.1 14.6 14.4 
3 0.99999 10021 13 31.5 37.7 13.2 17.7 
1 0.99999 16702 13 60.2 20.2 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 16702 13 43.2 28.5 14 14.3 
3 0.99999 16702 13 42 28.1 12.2 17.7 
1 0.99999 3340 26 60.6 19.8 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 3340 26 40.6 31 14.1 14.3 
3 0.99999 3340 26 30.5 39.6 12.2 17.7 
        
























1 0.99999 10021 26 65 15.5 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 10021 26 49 23 13.7 14.3 
3 0.99999 10021 26 45.7 25.9 10.8 17.7 
1 0.99999 16702 26 65 15.5 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 16702 26 52.3 19.7 13.7 14.3 
3 0.99999 16702 26 50.9 21.1 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99999 3340 39 65 15.5 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 3340 39 50.6 21.4 13.7 14.3 
3 0.99999 3340 39 49.5 22.1 10.8 17.7 
1 0.99999 10021 39 65.4 15.1 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 10021 39 53.6 18.5 13.6 14.3 
3 0.99999 10021 39 56.7 15.4 10.3 17.7 
1 0.99999 16702 39 64.6 15.9 8.73 10.8 
2 0.99999 16702 39 54.9 17.2 13.6 14.3 





Appendix 5. Conceptual model and Bayesian network node derivation and quantification 
Variable (node) Discretization methodology & justification States 
SOURCE 
Region Risk regions delineated by average mosquito dispersal 
distance using GIS analysis. Average mosquito flight 
distance found to be 100m (Harrington et al. 2005; Cox 




Landclass Land class was determined through GIS analysis using 
National Land Cover Database shapefile. The land class 
of the subregions were defined by the dominant land 
cover for each patch. 
High-density housing (HDH) 
Low-density housing (LDH) 
Forest (F) 
Non-forest vegetation (NFV) 
Wetlands (W) 
Buildings Number of buildings was determined in GIS using a 
shapefile available from the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team. Shapefile showed polygons of all 
existing buildings within the study area. Polygons were 
converted to points. 
Low = 2379 buildings 
Medium = 4334 buildings 
High = 11069 buildings 
Release ratio Release ratios reflect the average wild type mosquito 
population per patch: (total mosquito population / # of 
patches). Ratios chosen in agreement with previous 
modeling studies (Robert et al. 2014; Pham et al. 2019; 
and Sánchez et al. 2020) 
1:1 (3340 individuals) 
3:1 (10021 individuals) 
5:1 (16702 individuals) 
Accurate HDR Accurate homology directed repair (HDR). Rate of 
accurate HDR reflect one level (0.999) shown in 
previous lab studies (Hammond et al. 2016), and 
increasing levels theorized to be capable through the 
use of multiplexing (Marshall et al. 2017). 





Duration of Releases Frequency of releases in weeks, e.g. 13 = one release 
every week for 13 weeks. Weeks chosen in agreement 
with previous modeling studies (Robert et al. 2014; 





Wild population 8687 to 16413 (individuals) 
34 
 
Wild population (continued) Existing mosquito population estimates were obtained by 
combining the Ae. aegypti abundance estimates of the 
Barrera et al. (2019) study with our GIS analysis of the 
existing landscape characteristics of Ponce. A 50/50 sex 
ratio is assumed in the sex of offspring. Original 
population estimates are for female mosquitoes only, 
multiplying this by 2 gives an approximation of both male 
and female mosquitoes. States chosen represent ranges 
of mosquitoes per region based on Barrera et al. (2017) 
linear model equations. 
WildPop (landclass, Buildings) = HDH = 3.4*2*(# of 
Buildings), LDH = 9.8*2*(# of Buildings), F = 2.6*2*(# of 
Buildings), W = 2.1*2*(# of Buildings), NFV = 2.7*2*(# of 
Buildings). 
16413 to 20476 (individuals) 
20476 to 30216 (individuals) 
30216 to 66565 (individuals) 
66565 to 84166 (individuals) 
84166 to 217000 (individuals) 
Pesticide application Pesticides chosen for examination are from Agramonte 
et al. 2017. This study tested various levels of several 
pyrethroid insecticides on strains of Ae. aegypti found in 
Puerto Rico. Authors examined resistance levels, dose-
response relationships show pesticide efficacy. Analysis 






Mols pesticide (applied) Pesticides chosen for examination are from Agramonte 
et al. (2017) 
Levels of dose developed from natural Jenk's 
optimization for pesticide levels in Agramonte et al. 
(2017). 
1e-20 to 1.32e-11 (mols) 
1.32e-11 to 3.58e-11 (mols) 
3.58e-11 to 7.73e-11 (mols) 
7.73e-11 to 1.55e-10 (mols) 
1.55e-10 to 2.34e-10 (mols) 
2.34e-10 to 3.09e-10 (mols) 
HABITAT 
Human population Human population estimates derived from GIS analysis 
















Temperatures that are correlated to dengue thresholds 







Dengue threshold (pupae/1000 
people) 
Specific dengue transmission thresholds from Focks et 
al. (2000) table 6. Values are specific thresholds for 
each combination of herd immunity and temperature. 
70 (pupae/1000 people) 
100 (pupae/1000 people) 
130 (pupae/1000 people) 
190 (pupae/1000 people) 
260 (pupae/1000 people) 
380 (pupae/1000 people) 
530 (pupae/1000 people) 
750 (pupae/1000 people) 
1420 (pupae/1000 people) 
1690 (pupae/1000 people) 
2030 (pupae/1000 people) 
2920 (pupae/1000 people) 
4260 (pupae/1000 people) 
4470 (pupae/1000 people) 
9220 (pupae/1000 people) 
9570 (pupae/1000 people) 
14100 (pupae/1000 people) 
30550 (pupae/1000 people) 
EFFECTS 
Resulting population after gene drive 
release 
CPT filled out with case learning file from output of 
MGDrivE simulations. Data was either aggregated to 
show the population levels for the time period (day) in 
which the average number of mosquito per patch was at 
its lowest over the entire simulation, or the resulting 
population estimates and genotype at the end of the 
simulation period (6.75 years). 
0 (individuals) 
0 to 100 (individuals) 
100 to 2741 (individuals) 
2741 to 7626 (individuals) 
7626 to 13729 (individuals) 
13729 to 65701 (individuals) 
Proportion of gene drive resistant 0 to 0.05 
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Proportion of gene drive resistant 
(continued) 
Resistance to the drive occurs primarily through non-
homologous end joining (NHEJ; Unckless et al. 2017). 
Rates of resistance generation in MGDrivE are 
determined by 1 - (rate of accurate HDR). 
0.05 to 0.25 
0.25 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1 
Proportion survival Pesticides chosen for examination are from Agramonte 
et al. (2017). This study tested various levels of several 
pyrethroid insecticides on strains of Ae. aegypti found in 
Puerto Rico. Authors examined resistance levels, dose-
response relationships show pesticide efficacy. Analysis 
done in R. Full range of survival proportion in increments 
of 0.1 to estimate full range of effect. 
Survival (Pesticide, Mols) =  
Permethrin =  1/(1+exp(1.2428*(log(Mols)-log(4.2368e-
12)))),  
Etofenprox =  1/(1+exp(1.4305*(log(Mols)-log(1.7591e-
11)))), 
Deltamethrin =  1/(1+exp((6.4233e-01)*(log(Mols)-
log(1.0283e-13)))), 
DDT =  1/(1+exp((4.8912e-01)*(log(Mols)-log(6.0348e-
12)))), 
Transfluthrin =  1/(1+exp((5.7621e-01)*(log(Mols)-
log(3.0401e-12)))) 
0 to 0.1 
0.1 to 0.2 
0.2 to 0.3 
0.3 to 0.4 
0.4 to 0.5 
0.5 to 0.6 
0.6 to 0.7 
0.7 to 0.8 
0.8 to 0.9 
0.9 to 1 
Resulting population after pesticide 
application 
Outcomes of dose-response modeling for pesticides 
examined in Agramonte et al. (2017) applied to the 
population estimates resulting from the gene drive. 
States are 0 to 1 to represent extinction, 0 to 100 to 
represent near extinction, and then Jenk's natural breaks 
optimization.  
0 to 1 (individuals) 
1 to 100 (individuals) 
100 to 2741 (individuals) 
2741 to 7626 (individuals) 
7626 to 13729 (individuals) 





Equations for pupal production from standing crop of 
female mosquitoes are derived from Focks et al. (2000). 
A 50/50 sex ratio was assumed, total population/2 gives 
approximation of female mosquitoes. 
0 to 1 (pupae) 
1 to 114 (pupae) 
114 to 3124 (pupae) 
3124 to 8693 (pupae) 
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Pupae (continued) Pupae (Temperature, TotalAfterPesticide) =  
22 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*1.14, 
24 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*0.94, 
26 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*0.75, 
28 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*0.57, 
30 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*0.41, 
32 =  ((TotalAfterPesticide)/2)*0.26 
8693 to 33117.5 (pupae) 
Pupae per 1000 people Pupae per 1000 people estimates are derived from 
dividing the pupae estimates per the human population 
per risk region and multiplying by 1000.  
0 to 100 (pupae/1000 people) 
100 to 200 (pupae/1000 
people) 
200 to 300 (pupae/1000 
people) 
300 to 2318.82 (pupae/1000 
people) 
IMPACTS 
Zika transmission Transmission thresholds derived from Barrera et al. 
(2017). Zero = 0 to 0.2 females/trap/day, Low = 0.2 to 
0.8 females/trap/day, Medium = 0.8 to 1.5 





Dengue reduction Dengue transmission thresholds derived from Focks et 
al. (2000). Dengue transmission states represent the 
likelihood of being below the transmission threshold, at 
the transmission threshold, or above the transmission 
threshold in terms of pupae/1000 people. 
Below threshold 
At threshold 
Above threshold 
 
